When pregnancy not a suspension ground

When pregnancy not a suspension ground | Daily Tribune

This situation I am to discuss is nothing new. It is so common nowadays that an employee gets pregnant out of wedlock. Employers, when this situation arises, at times impose sanctions, be they light or harsh, on the employee. They brand the act as immoral and penalize the allegedly erring employee. But what is the rule really? Is conceiving a child without the benefit of marriage automatically an immoral act? And because it is immoral, can the employer lawfully mete out a punishment to her? Or if the employee conceives a child, whose father is not her lawful husband, is this considered immoral?

In one case, a schoolteacher, while unmarried, conceived a child. There was no legal impediment to prevent her from getting married. Neither was there one for her boyfriend. In fact, they planned to tie the knot. But solely because she was not yet married when she got pregnant, the school suspended her. This greatly offended the teacher who sought relief from the National Labor Relations Commission.

After she got married, the school lifted her suspension and told her to report for work. She refused, however, contending that a case for illegal suspension had been lodged with the NLRC. The long and short of it was that a legal battle ensued which over the years found its way up to the Supreme Court. And to finally settle the matter, the Highest Tribunal rendered a decision in favor of the teacher-employee, citing previous jurisprudence. (Ruling paraphrased to meet article length —- editor).

The law imposes a standard of public and secular morality, not religious morality. Public and secular morality refers to conduct detrimental to the existence and progress of human society. Reliance on religious beliefs for public policies risks promoting a specific religious agenda.

The Court has ruled in similar cases that premarital sexual relations leading to pregnancy out of wedlock are not inherently immoral. In Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, the petitioner and her boyfriend had no legal impediment to marry and later did so. The Court found no law penalizing an unmarried mother for consensual sexual activity or contravening fundamental state policy.

Educational institutions may uphold religious doctrines, but such actions must align with secular morality. The petitioner’s conduct, though unconventional, was not disgraceful or immoral under the law.”

And in Inocente v. St. Vincent Foundation for Children and Aging Inc.:

Consensual sexual relations between adults with no legal impediments to marry are not deemed immoral. The respondent’s private actions, while not conforming to institutional beliefs, did not violate any law or societal norms.

The suspension based on premarital pregnancy was illegal. Employers must ensure substantive and procedural due process before disciplinary action. In this case, the suspension was predetermined without hearing the respondent’s side, violating due process requirements.”

In one case, a schoolteacher, while unmarried, conceived a child. There was no legal impediment to prevent her from getting married.

I agree with the decision of the Supreme Court. The mere act of conceiving a child without the benefit of marriage does not necessarily make it immoral. Indeed, there is no law that punishes this. Clearly, any penalty of suspension or termination on grounds of immorality cannot be countenanced.

The situation would be totally different if a married employee conceives a child, whose father is not her husband. Indubitably, that is immorality. And our laws, both family and penal, render that illegal.

When this happens, there definitely is a ground to impose disciplinary action. It will then depend on the circumstances when a penalty can be imposed.

Employers must carefully investigate and ascertain the facts carefully before jumping the gun. Otherwise, their action would backfire on them.

The facts and quoted portion of the decision are from Bohol Wisdom School et al. v. Miraflor Mabao (G.R. No. 252124, 23 July 2024).