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No simple seduction in relation to RA 7610

The Supreme Court had the opportunity in this case to discuss how there can be no conviction for simple seduction in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610.

No simple seduction in relation to RA 7610
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The accused was charged with and convicted of simple seduction in relation to Republic Act (RA) 7610 by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s ruling, holding the accused liable for simple seduction in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.

The accused elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, arguing that the appellate court modified his sentence by making the crime for which he was held liable even worse.

The Supreme Court had the opportunity in this case to discuss how there can be no conviction for simple seduction in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.

“To recall, the Information filed against petitioner was for ‘simple seduction in relation to Republic Act 7610.’ The trial court convicted the petitioner, while the appellate court affirmed but modified the nomenclature of the crime to ‘simple seduction in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act 7610.’

“The Court holds that there can be no crime of Simple Seduction in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. People v Tulagan is enlightening: If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child ‘exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse’ because she agreed to indulge in sexual intercourse ‘for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,’ then the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and there was consent.

“That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section 5(b), RA 7610, and not under Article 335 of the RPC [now Article 266-A]. But if the said victim does not give her consent to sexual intercourse in the sense that the sexual intercourse was committed through force, threat or intimidation, the crime is rape under Paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC.

“However, if the same victim gave her consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit, consideration, coercion or influence is involved, then there is no crime committed, except in those cases where ‘force, threat or intimidation’ as an element of rape is substituted by ‘moral ascendancy or moral authority,’ like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it is punished under the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 or simple seduction under Article 338.

“For a charge under RA 7610 to prosper, the minor victim must be a child EPSOSA. The Court had occasion to discuss this requisite in Tulagan: To avoid further confusion, we dissect the phrase ‘children exploited in prostitution’ as an element of violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of RA 7610 and having in mind that the term ‘lascivious conduct’ has a clear definition which does not include ‘sexual intercourse,’ the phrase ‘children exploited in prostitution’ contemplates four scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct; (b) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual intercourse.

“The term ‘other sexual abuse,’ on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of ‘child abuse’ under Section 3, Article I of RA 7610 and ‘sexual abuse’ under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases.

“In the former provision, ‘child abuse’ refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child, which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, ‘sexual abuse’ includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

“In Quimvel, it was held that the term ‘coercion or influence’ is broad enough to cover or even be synonymous with the term ‘force or intimidation.’ Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that ‘coercion or influence’ is used in Section 5 of RA 7610 to qualify or refer to the means through which ‘any adult, syndicate or group’ compels a child to indulge in sexual intercourse.

“On the other hand, the use of ‘money, profit or any other consideration’ is the other mode by which a child indulges in sexual intercourse, without the participation of ‘any adult, syndicate or group.’

“In other words, ‘coercion or influence’ of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse is clearly exerted NOT by the offender whose liability is based on Section 5(b) of RA 7610 for committing a sexual act with a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse. Rather, the ‘coercion or influence’ is exerted upon the child by ‘any adult, syndicate, or group’ whose liability is found under Section 5(a) for engaging in, promoting, facilitating or inducing child prostitution, whereby the sexual intercourse is the necessary consequence of the prostitution.

“Tulagan categorically ruled that there could be no instance that an Information may charge the same accused with the crime of rape where ‘force, threat or intimidation’ is the element of the crime under the Revised Penal Code, and at the same time a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610, where the victim indulged in sexual intercourse because she/he is exploited in prostitution either for money, profit, or any other consideration, or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.

“The Court now opines that in the same manner, where an accused is charged with Simple Seduction, where deceit is a fundamental element, such accused cannot be charged with a violation of Section 5(b) because this presupposes either (a) money, profit, or any other consideration or (b) coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group, as the driving cause of consent of the child to engage in sexual intercourse. Deceit, in the specific sense of being an element of Simple Seduction, cannot and does not fall under (a) or (b).”

The facts and quoted portion of the redacted decision are from SC G.R. 240385 (8 October 2025).