A mother sued her two children for the annulment of the sale of her property to them. She contended that her daughter merely asked for permission to administer the property. The daughter then requested that the mother execute a deed of sale in her favor. It was allegedly simulated and not intended to transfer ownership. The mother acceded. She later realized that the property had been transferred to both her daughter and son, despite that not being their intention.

The trial court annulled the sale in favor of the mother. The two children questioned the decision all the way to the Supreme Court, to no avail. The ruling became final and executory.

Subsequently, their mother died. The siblings of the two children filed a motion in the same court to have their mother’s last will and testament approved. Notably, it was filed as a motion, meaning a mere incidental request in the case involving the simulated sale of land.

The trial court granted the motion and approved the will, which disinherited three of the decedent’s children, including the two she had sued. The two disinherited children contested this action. The court denied their motion, arguing it was in the best position to determine the validity of the disinheritance. It reasoned that it was already familiar with the family’s circumstances, having ruled earlier on the land sale.

The disinherited children elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. The central issue: Was probate still necessary? Could the trial court approve such a motion — even assuming it had authority — given that the original case had already reached finality?

The Supreme Court ruled:

“Probate is the legal mechanism through which the authenticity of a will is ascertained. It is required before any will can have force or validity, as ‘no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.’

“Rule 76, Section 1 of the Rules of Court prescribes that an action for the allowance or disallowance of a will shall come in the form of a petition filed by the executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate before the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed.

“The succeeding sections of the same rule enumerate the required contents of such petition, including publication requirements and notice to specified persons.

“Here, the subject Motion to Approve Last Will bears little resemblance to the petition contemplated under Rule 76. Glaringly, it was filed not as an independent special proceeding but as a mere incident to an ordinary civil action.

“The motion also failed to meet the stringent requirements regarding content, publication, and notice provided under said rule. Otherwise stated, the RTC ought to have denied the motion outright. Its decision to grant the same, under the pretext of avoiding multiplicity of suits and further inconvenience to the parties, was in clear excess of its jurisdiction.

“Withal, the flaw in the RTC’s ruling extends beyond its grant of an inappropriate Motion to Approve Last Will; it also lies in the scope of the RTC’s jurisdiction. At this point in the proceedings, the RTC’s jurisdiction was limited to ordering the execution of its final and executory judgment, in accordance with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

“It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue, as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order, is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court that rendered it to further alter or amend it. It thereby becomes immutable and unalterable, and any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.

“Mindful of these parameters, the resolution of issues regarding the settlement of Sebastiana’s estate — matters wholly unrelated to the execution of the decision regarding the annulment case — was in palpable excess of its jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction, the impugned orders issued by the RTC can neither be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. Therefore, all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.”

Facts and quoted decision redacted from Rosalinda Mantel et al. v. Sebastiana Montero, G.R. 255214, 27 January 2025.