Bongbong is trapped in a high-stakes power triangle while the Philippines sits on a goldmine it cannot touch.

The country imports 98 percent of its crude from a region wobbling on the edge. Iran chokes Hormuz. Bab el‑Mandeb. The disruption in supply cascades through an economy already reeling on thin margins.

Beneath the West Philippine Sea: billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of gas. Ours. By law. By every map that matters. Enough to stop depending on the vagaries of the Gulf.

It’s a prize tantalizingly close but still out of reach. Because the country we contest at sea is the same one sitting on top of it.

The proposal: a joint exploration with China. Big, efficient, relentless China, with the wherewithal to extract what is ours.

The rub: the Philippines can’t simply let the Chinese drill. Our Constitution forbids 100-percent foreign ownership in energy projects. Past deals with Beijing collapsed. Voided.

Retired Philippine diplomats, this time, have suggested a 60-40/20 share structure that preserves Filipino constitutional control while addressing Beijing’s demands. Focus is Recto Bank. Massive reserves. Only part of a bigger West Philippine Sea play.

A neat solution, as incidents continue near Scarborough, Subi Reef, and surrounding waters and are expected to persist, particularly around the 10-year anniversary of the 2016 Hague arbitral ruling.

Gas is promised to flow. The temperature in the region drops. In theory.

But the relief is not immediate. Offshore gas takes years, even under ideal conditions. We might be even sacrificing our sovereignty for a resource that the world will be trying to stop using by the time it actually starts flowing.

Energy projects are slow. They’ll lock us in. The barrels extracted under a joint venture is a subtle lesson in dependence. China wants the habit to make Manila rely on it. To normalize its presence in disputed waters. Train Filipino bureaucrats to negotiate in Beijing’s favor.

Former justice Antonio Carpio points out that Beijing sees joint development as an activity under Chinese sovereignty. With others like the Philippines merely “participants.”

In Beijing’s logic, it’s not “sharing” resources, but only allowing others to extract under Chinese authority and grace.

The oil extracted in this mindset sends a subtle, cumulative message: Our EEZ is already under Chinese authority. Over time, this can undermine the 2016 Arbitral Award. We might think we’re harvesting our own oil; China thinks it’s hosting Manila inside China.

Energy can be found; sovereignty cannot be bought back once given. Bongbong is playing two games at once. On the ground, he hosts US bases, greenlights Subic’s munitions, keeps Washington invested. Except it’s leverage we hope never gets tested. Chinese energy is leverage we live under every day.

Southeast Asian nations hedge like this all the time. Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand.

But in the logic of great powers, “neutrality” in the West Philippine Sea is a position of vulnerability. The deal signals to Washington, Tokyo, Canberra the Philippines’ loyalty is negotiable, and thus exploitable.

Yet on paper, sovereignty is loud and firm. Executive Order 111 stamps Philippine names on 131 features in the Kalayaan Island Group, updates maps, official documents and schoolbooks. Pag-asa Island remains the center of government.

We assert what’s rightfully ours, even if reality forces a softer handshake elsewhere. It’s a real risk.

The Philippines wants a seat on the UN Security Council. But that seat rests on one thing: we followed the law and won. Against a superpower.

Trade that away for the promise of gas, and we lose the only thing that makes us worth listening to.