Distinction between rape and sexual abuse (1)

X was charged with and convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). He was the teacher of the aggrieved party, who was then 14 years old.

During trial, the child testified that the accused had sexual intercourse with her. Despite losing in the trial and appellate courts, the accused elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. His issue — whether the CA erred in convicting him of two counts of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction. It was at this juncture that the Highest Court made a distinction between rape under the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under RA 7610.

Thus, the Supreme Court decreed, “Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610 provides that a child, whether male or female, who indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult, is considered a child exploited in prostitution or a child subjected to any other sexual abuse.

“Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases provides: g) Sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

“In the recent case of XXX260233 v People, the Court En Banc revisited the provisions of Republic Act 7610 and extensively discussed the distinctions between rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610.

“In XXX260233, the Court ratiocinated in this wise: Here, a plain and straightforward interpretation of Section 5 of Republic Act 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other sexual abuse as those who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult. Yet, despite extensive jurisprudence on child abuse cases, the word ‘indulges’ in Section 5 of Republic Act 7610 has never been specifically examined or analyzed.

“The word ‘indulges’ is of significant importance in resolving the issue in the case at bar. The different meanings of the word ‘indulges’ in various dictionaries suggest a notion of ‘consent’ or ‘permission,’ albeit with some reservations. The Court finds that the term ‘sexual abuse,’ as defined under RA 7610, encompasses situations wherein a minor indulges — or, put differently, consents, albeit defectively — to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct as a result of coercion or undue influence exerted by an adult.

“The presence — or, at the very least, the semblance — of consent on the part of the minor, which justifies the application of RA 7610, is further reinforced by Section 2(g) of the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). The IRR defines sexual abuse as including the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

“A review of Section 2(g) leads to the conclusion that the word ‘engage’ suggests active participation by the child, who is not merely a passive victim of sexual abuse but engages in it precisely due to the ‘employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion’ exerted by the adult.

“Indeed, the use of the word ‘engage’ clearly indicates the legislature’s intent for RA 7610 to cover situations where a child consents, albeit with the consent being defective. It is not designed to cover acts where the minor is completely unconscious, overpowered, or unwilling from the outset. (To be continued)

The facts and quoted redacted portion of the decision are from SC G.R. 267860 (3 February 2026).