When large-scale illegal recruitment exists (2)

The accused was charged with and convicted of large-scale illegal recruitment. She and her partner recruited several persons and promised them well-paying jobs as worm pickers in Canada. Enticed, the victims paid them the amounts both accused asked for. The latter, however, were not able to deliver on their promise.

When the victims found out that they were not POEA-accredited, they sued both accused for illegal recruitment. One stood trial, while the other remained at large. As for the accused who underwent judicial determination, she appealed her case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, denied her appeal.

Still believing in her contention that she was not part of the illegal recruitment, she brought the matter up to the Supreme Court. This gave the Highest Court the opportunity to discuss what constitutes illegal recruitment and why it applies to her case. Here’s the continuation of the ruling.

“Based on its definition, illegal recruitment may be committed by any person, whether or not they are licensed to operate a private employment agency or a holder of authority to engage in recruitment and placement activities.

“In Toston v People of the Philippines, the Court held that there are three modes of committing illegal recruitment: (1) illegal recruitment per se, as defined in the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act 8042; (2) illegal recruitment practices, as listed [(a) to (n)] in the same provision; and (3) prohibited practices amounting to illegal recruitment as numerically listed [(1) to (7)], still in Section 6 of Republic Act 8042.

“Illegal recruitment per se can only be committed by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, when they undertake any of the recruitment and placement activities listed in the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act 8042, i.e., canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services, promising, or advertising for employment abroad.

“On the other hand, illegal recruitment practices and prohibited practices amounting to illegal recruitment may be committed by any person or entity, regardless of recruitment licensing status. Thus, when committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority, the elements of large-scale illegal recruitment are as follows: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;

“(2) the offender undertakes any of the recruitment and placement activities, illegal recruitment practices, or prohibited practices amounting to illegal recruitment listed in Section 6 of Republic Act 8042; and (3) the offender commits any of the acts of illegal recruitment against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

“The prosecution was able to establish the existence of all the foregoing elements of large-scale illegal recruitment. First, it is undisputed that Caluducan had no valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. The POEA issued a certification stating that Tugaoen and Caluducan are not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

“As correctly held by the RTC, the POEA certification is a public document which is prima facie evidence of the contents stated therein, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 23 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, Caluducan did not present any evidence to negate the contents of the POEA certification. Second, despite not having a valid license or authority, Caluducan engaged in recruitment activities.

“In proving illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to deploy the complainants abroad. In an attempt to escape liability, Caluducan argued that it was only Tugaoen who recruited Viloria et al. because she was the one who promised them overseas jobs, and it was also Tugaoen who received the placement fees. The Court is not convinced.”

The facts and quoted portion of the decision are from G.R. 268486 (19 February 2026).