Scenario one: The court grants A’s application for confirmation of ownership and thus issuance of a title in his name over a piece of land. B subsequently files an action to nullify the title because he is the real owner, not A.

Scenario two: In an action for mere possession of real property, A assails and also asks for the nullification of the title of the adverse party.

Both scenarios one and two involve real property and also the nullification of the title of the defendant.

But only one can prosper. Scenario one is a direct action that can thrive in court.

Scenario two, by contrast, is a collateral attack that the court will disallow.

So what is the distinction between these two actions?

For a better understanding, here is the Supreme Court’s discussion. “Section 48 of Presidential Decree 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate of title, viz.: Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

In Sps. In Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, this Tribunal distinguished between direct and 0collateral attack as follows:

An aggressive action is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed.

The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

In the instant case, petitioners argue that respondents are not innocent purchasers for value and were in bad faith in registering the subject lot.

Such claim is merely incidental to the principal case of quieting of title and recovery of possession, and thus, an indirect attack on respondents’ title.

Citing Sampaco v. Lantud (Sampaco) and Development Bank of the Phils. v. CA and Carlos Cajes (DBP), petitioners insist that their counterclaim is a direct attack against the respondents’ title.

After a careful perusal, petitioners cannot invoke Sampaco and DBP in their favor. Considering that the factual milieu in these cases is not on all fours with the instant case. In Sampaco, therein petitioner filed a counterclaim and prayed for the cancellation of respondent’s title and reconveyance of the subject property; thus: x x x Petitioner filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages, and attorney’s fees for the unfounded complaint and prayed for its dismissal.

He also sought the cancellation of respondent’s OCT P-658 and the reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. Similarly, in DBP, the counterclaim filed by the private respondent therein was specifically for reconveyance of land which was erroneously registered in the name of another person; thus: x x x Having been the sole occupant of the land in question, private respondent may seek reconveyance of his property despite the lapse of more than 10 years.

Nor is there any obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT 10101. It is true that the indefeasibility of Torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked.

In the instant case, the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by the petitioner against the private respondent, not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT 10101 on which the petitioner bases its right.

To rule on the issue of validity in a case for recovery of possession is tantamount to a collateral attack.

However, it should not be overlooked that private respondent filed a counterclaim against petitioner, claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages.

From the extant jurisprudence, there is no arguing that for a counterclaim to be considered a direct attack on the title, it must specifically pray for annulment of the questioned title and reconveyance of ownership of the subject property.”

The facts and redacted decision are from S.C. G.R. No. 222530 (16 October 2019).