Victory undone
The deal with China is all wrong and risks walking back the country’s unassailable position in the West Philippine Sea.
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The deal with China is all wrong and risks walking back the country’s unassailable position in the West Philippine Sea.
Why reverse a victory when the world already recognized it?
An international arbitral tribunal, in a landmark ruling on 12 July 2016, under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, rejected China’s sweeping claims over most of the South China Sea, its so-called nine-dash line that it expanded to a ten-dash line.
The decision specified that the waters around Ayungin Shoal fell within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and that there was no legal basis for China’s claims there. The Department of Foreign Affairs said the ruling was final, valid, and binding. Forty-four countries expressed their absolute support for it.
Only China, for obvious reasons, did not recognize it.
In 2024, retired Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio said that under the Marcos administration, the Philippines and China entered into a “provisional agreement” covering resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre, the grounded Navy ship anchoring the Philippine presence at Ayungin Shoal.
Under the agreement, the Philippines committed not to bring construction materials to the shoal and to notify China in advance before sending resupply vessels. It also allows for what is described as an on-site inspection, conducted from a distance.
The deal with China is all wrong and risks walking back the country’s unassailable position in the West Philippine Sea. A “provisional” agreement is meant to be a temporary arrangement, while a dispute is still unresolved, pending a tribunal’s decision, according to Carpio.
The dispute was brought to the Permanent Court of Arbitration which ruled in the Philippines’ favor. Carpio argues there is no longer a reason to maintain an arrangement that treats China as having some say over Philippine territory.
His view is that the agreement, whatever its intent, gives China something to point to later, a document in which the Philippines appeared to accept that China holds superior rights in an area the tribunal had already awarded to the Philippines outright. Carpio recommends that the agreement be terminated.
The warning of the ex-magistrate, who has been a pillar of the campaign that resulted in international support for the Philippines, found a fresh test case on 20 July 2026 when a China Coast Guard boat closed to within 20 meters of the BRP Sierra Madre, prompting Philippine Navy personnel to deploy their own vessels to push it back.
The confrontation left two Filipino sailors injured, one after allegedly being struck on the head with a wooden baton. Manila and Beijing traded accusations over who provoked the incident, and President Marcos summoned China’s ambassador the following day.
The clash is precisely the kind of scenario that was anticipated. The 2024 provisional agreement was built around the presumption that Chinese vessels would maintain a monitoring presence near Ayungin Shoal, inspecting resupply missions “from a distance,” in exchange for Philippine restraint on any construction activity.
In Carpio’s view, an arrangement premised on China having a legitimate role to monitor and approve Philippine movements at the shoal does not lower the odds of this kind of incident happening due to the proximity of the protagonists.
The Marcos administration has also relied too heavily on the presence of allied navies — of the United States, Japan, Australia, and others — sailing through the WPS to assert that these are Philippine waters, rather than acting on its own to assert its rights there.
In comparison, he pointed to Malaysia and Indonesia, both of which do not have an arbitral ruling or a mutual defense treaty with the United States.
Both sent survey and drilling ships into waters also claimed by China, over China’s objections, and proceeded with their operations. In both cases, allied naval vessels happened to be transiting the area at the time, though neither government had requested an escort.
Carpio contrasts this with the situation at Reed Bank, which lies within the Philippines’ EEZ and is covered by the arbitral ruling, but where the exploration for gas has not moved forward.
It all boils down to an obstacle that is not legal and the lack of political will to move forward. Or worse, a transactional capitulation.
