Judicial discretion superior in plea bargaining

Judicial discretion superior in plea bargaining | Daily Tribune

Is the consent of the prosecution indispensable for valid plea bargaining?

This was the ultimate issue resolved in the recent case of Alvero v. People of the Philippines (G.R. 260214, 17 April 2023), determining the dividing line between prosecutorial prerogatives and judicial discretion.

Alvero and Aporta were charged, under the theory of conspiracy, with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of the Republic Act (RA) 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.1459 grams of shabu. While accused Alvero pleaded “not guilty” during arraignment, he subsequently filed for a proposal for plea bargaining to allow him to plead guilty to the lower offense of Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165, in accordance with A.M. 18-03-16-SC (Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases).

The prosecution opposed the proposal by invoking DoJ Department Circular 027 which does not allow plea bargaining when being charged with theory of conspiracy. The prosecution further explained, among others, that the acceptable plea to the charge is Possession of Dangerous Drugs under RA 9165.

The lower court granted the proposal. The Office of the Solicitor General then filed a Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion when the lower court allowed plea bargain without the consent of the prosecution.

The Supreme Court ruled that the courts may overrule objections on plea bargaining on certain grounds.

While the prosecutorial discretion allows authority to prosecute the case filed before the courts, there is an obvious limit to prosecutorial prerogatives as the prosecutor has no control over how the court would decide the case.

Citing the case of People v. Montierro (G.R. Nos. 254564 and 254974, 26 July 2022), the Supreme Court explained that if the prosecutor’s objections is anchored on what is exclusively a prosecutorial prerogative, then to override the objection would be a violation of the separation of powers between executive and judiciary. However, when the objection is anchored on an “internal guideline” of the executive that directly runs counter to the issuance promulgated by the judiciary, such as the plea bargaining framework, then it is not a violation but a mere assertion of the principle of separation of powers.

In overruling the objection of the prosecution, which is solely grounded on an executive issuance contradicting a court-issued rule on plea bargaining, it is simply a recognition of the Supreme Court’s rule-making power in the Constitution.

In this case, there was no grave abuse of discretion when the lower court allowed the plea bargaining because the proposal conforms with the plea bargaining framework in drugs cases.

However, the Supreme Court noted that it is required in the Montierro guidelines that the court determine if (a) accused is a recidivist, habitual offender, known in community as drug addict, has undergone rehabilitation but had relapse or repeatedly charged, or (b) the evidence of guilt is strong. Since they were not complied with, the Court mandated the lower court to hear the objections and rule on merits.

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