US President Donald J. Trump’s chest-thumping defense of “America First” at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland — where nine years earlier Chinese President Xi Jinping had given his own speech championing globalization — captures the defining tug-of-war in the world today.

Not a few are wondering: is China “winning” while the United States appears to cede leadership of the global economy under a protectionist American president?

The short answer: China is advancing in important ways, but the contest is complex and, at this juncture, neither side enjoys uncontested victory.

Why it looks like China is gaining ground

Over the past decade, Beijing has effected a clear, long-term strategy — massive state-directed investment in manufacturing, infrastructure, and technology; sustained support for global outreach (Belt and Road); and deliberate moves to dominate strategic green and digital industries.

China today leads global production in solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. It is the world’s largest market for many cleantech products and has scaled up manufacturing in ways few competitors can match.

Its construction of ports, rails, and industrial links across Asia, Africa, and Latin America has created economic dependencies and diplomatic leverage. In short, China has built tangible industrial heft and outreach on a global scale.

Trump-style American retrenchment accentuates China’s gains. Public threats to withdraw security guarantees, unilateral tariffs, and disdain for multilateral institutions strain alliances and are reducing the ability of the US to solidify trust and sway among its even most traditional of allies.

When Washington signals unpredictability, partners naturally hedge — sometimes by leaning towards Beijing or by seeking independent pathways — eroding a once-solid Western consensus that had long reinforced US leadership in the world sphere.

But “winning” is not solely measured by factories or sales of wind turbines.

The US retains decisive advantages that are harder to replicate: world-leading universities and private R&D ecosystems, dominant capital markets, a commanding tech innovation base (especially in software, semiconductors, and AI), unrivaled military reach, and basically, still, a norms-based system that underwrites global trade and investment rules.

America’s strengths in innovation and finance sustain long-term productivity gains that manufacturing capacity alone cannot guarantee. Moreover, democratic governance, legal transparency, and institutional resilience remain attractive to many investors wary of political risk — advantages that are not easily displaced.

China’s model has its own vulnerabilities. Heavy state intervention, overcapacity in some sectors, debt-driven infrastructure projects, and tensions over intellectual property and rule of law create friction.

Its global ascent also provokes strategic pushback: the EU, Japan, Australia and an attentive US are crafting industrial, investment, and standards policies intended to limit dependency and protect supply chains. China’s surveillance state and human rights record complicate its soft-power appeal in many capitals.

So what does Trump’s posture change? It accelerates friend-foe realignments and raises the costs of cooperation among democracies.

It can deliver short-term bargaining leverage — tariffs, threats, and transactional deals — but it also increases geopolitical uncertainty.

If US policy undercuts alliances and multilateral norms, it cedes institutional influence that China can exploit. Yet, if US domestic policy pivots — rebuilding alliances, investing in technology, and combining protection where necessary with international engagement — the United States can very well reclaim competitive ground.

In sum, China is making measurable gains in industrial scale, green technology manufacturing, and geopolitical reach.

Trump-style protectionism amplifies those gains by creating openings Beijing can exploit. But “winning” the global economy is not purely zero-sum and not predetermined.

The United States still commands structural advantages in innovation, finance, and security; the outcome depends on policy choices by Washington and its partners — and on China’s ability to address its internal economic and political constraints.

The near term may favor Beijing’s momentum, but the long term will hinge on whether democracies can coordinate to invest, innovate, and uphold the rules that sustain an open global economy.

The United States can survive a turbulent presidency and continue to anchor a rules-based global order, but survival is not inevitable. It requires the repair of frayed alliances and reducing polarization.

If those things occur, the US can not only survive but also reassert its role as a leading force in global stability and influence.

If they do not, the world will become more fragmented, and America’s influence will decline not instantly, but steadily.

If that comes to pass, will we be ready to see the world as we know it shaped by the ascendance of a rival superpower that had long been eager to shove America aside and assume, uncontested, global supremacy?