A substantial part of the 2026 National Expenditure Program will be earmarked for next year’s budget.

A ballpark figure estimates more than P100 billion will go to just four dole programs, including the Walang Gutom Program (WGP), in which food credits via an Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card will be provided to 750,000 food-poor households next year.

For this year alone, some P10.8 billion was allotted in the 2025 budget for the 300,000 households covered by the program.

The WGP—like the cash handout programs before it, namely the Ayuda sa Kapos ang Kita Program (AKAP), Tulong Panghanapbuhay sa Ating Disadvantaged/Displaced Workers (TUPAD), and Assistance to Individuals in Crisis Situations (AICS)—has vague provisions, unlike the flagship Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps), which is targeted and has specific requirements such as school attendance for children, aimed at improving the social condition of the beneficiaries.

The heavy allocation for doles reflects a populist approach that prioritizes visible, immediate relief to garner political support.

This strategy undermines the aim of transformative growth, since the programs’ design—cash transfers, short-term jobs, and crisis aid—treats the symptoms of poverty rather than its causes, perpetuating the cycle of dependency and budgetary strain.

Moreover, the long-term benefits of these programs, which effectively throw money at the impoverished segment of the population, are in doubt—especially considering the funds are raised through debt, such as grants and borrowings.

Budget watchdogs said the opportunity cost is staggering. The doles, totaling more than P240 billion this year and the next, could fund game-changing projects such as modernizing a fifth of the outdated irrigation systems, building 500 new public schools, or doubling research and development spending.

In the 2025 budget, landmark projects such as the country’s first subway had to give way to the ayuda blitz and pork barrel deals, as funding for these crucial projects was transferred to unprogrammed appropriations.

The modernization program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was reduced by P5 billion, which was reallocated to insertions and to bolster cash subsidies for the poor.

The sidetracked items had been aligned with the goal of achieving upper-middle-income status for the country by 2025 and fostering a competitive, inclusive economy.

The wrong priorities contributed to the country missing the bus in the latest World Bank reckoning of the development levels of nations.

Instead, the budget—tilted toward doles—risks locking the country in a low-growth trap, where short-term relief overshadows long-term prosperity.

The focus of aid programs would be better spent on scaling up investments in education and skills training, targeting a reduction in unemployment.

The trade-offs in the ayuda-oriented budget are crowding out investments, inducing inflationary pressures, creating administrative inefficiencies, and neglecting structural reforms—all of which threaten long-term growth and fiscal health.

With increasing political pressure on national leadership, the test for policymakers will be whether someone—particularly an economic manager—stands up to point out the folly of retrogressive Ayudanomics.