A coverup of the safety hazards at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport after the gruesome SUV crash on 4 May that claimed the lives of a four-year-old girl and a 29-year-old man cannot be allowed.

The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), which became the regulator — from being the operator — of the NAIA after New NAIA Infrastructure Corp. (NNIC) took over with a 25-year management contract in September last year, appears timid about holding the company accountable for the incident.

The public focus is on the bollards, which failed to protect the people from the wayward vehicle.

Instead of being a barrier, the bollards were mere decorations that cost the government P8 million in a contract with a firm called Kontrak Enterprises based in Navotas. DAILY TRIBUNE dialed a telephone number for the company it found on LinkedIn but there was no answer.

Several international security audits of the airport recommended the installation of protective bollards between the access roads and parking areas in front of the entrances to the passenger terminals.

In 2017, the United Kingdom’s Department for Transport flagged the lack of “hostile vehicle mitigation measures” at NAIA, including bollards or concrete planters, citing the risk of vehicle attacks.

Bollards were not installed until 2019, following a second audit in 2018 by the Australian Homeland Security, which cited the same security concerns.

The project was rushed after an initial bidding failed in January 2019, as it was deemed an infrastructure project requiring a Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board license, which deterred bidders.

Kontrak Enterprises, the sole bidder in February 2019, had limited financial capacity and its prior experience was a smaller P5.73-million bollard project.

The 4 May tragedy revealed that the NAIA bollards were made of steel but were not deeply embedded in the concrete foundation.

MIAA gave the same excuse for the futile barriers as the NNIC: “structural constraints,” which may affect the arrival area below Terminal 1.

The steps taken by the airport overseer are as stupid as they can get.

MIAA’s engineering team, led by assistant manager Antonio Mendoza, conducted an investigation into the incident and concluded that the “bollards installed at Terminal 1 were not embedded deeply enough into the ground.”

With such geniuses, it would not be very comforting to fly in and out of NAIA.

MIAA general manager Eric Ines continued with the smoke screen: “There’s no way for me to conduct a crash test now, I also can’t place blame. Many of those involved in the project have either retired or passed on. This went through a proper bidding process, and without proof I cannot speculate.”

Ines should be reminded that lives were lost due to somebody’s negligence.

NNIC has been deflecting blame, saying a thorough probe is being conducted into the bollards and that the drop-off zones at Terminals 1 and 2 are being redesigned.

Compared with neighboring airports, the NAIA bollards are a fiasco.

Singapore’s Changi Airport employs crash-rated bollards designed to stop vehicles weighing up to 7.5 tons traveling at 50 miles per hour (80 km/h).

These high-strength steel bollards are embedded deeply, from four to six feet, in reinforced concrete foundations and strategically placed around terminal perimeters, drop-off zones, and high-traffic pedestrian areas.

The reactive approach of NNIC which did not inspect or upgrade the bollards until the recent incident is a disgrace.

While it can get away with its shortcomings with the MIAA, international audits expected after the incident will put the NAIA in another adverse global spotlight.

Previous poor ratings on NAIA greatly affected travel into the country.

With tourism picking up, a slide in the security assessment of the airport will be an unnecessary spoiler.