In the prosecution of a criminal case, we always want the most damning evidence against the accused to ensure a certain conviction. In this case, the accused was charged with transporting a minor for purposes of prostitution in exchange for money. During the trial, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence against him, including his recorded chat logs and videos. The accused assailed their admissibility. He vigorously argued that it was a violation not only of his right to privacy but also of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law.

At first blush, his argument may seem to hold water. After all, those conversations are intended to be private, in fact, secret. Can his argument withstand scrutiny? Should the evidence be considered the fruit of the poisonous tree? The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine prohibits the use of evidence that is obtained unlawfully by government authorities.

In this instance, the Highest Tribunal said:

“We reject Rodriguez’s contentions that the recorded chat logs and videos are inadmissible in evidence for violation of his right to privacy. Republic Act No. 10173, also known as the Data Privacy Act of 2012, allows the processing of sensitive personal information when it relates to the determination of criminal liability of a data subject and when necessary for the protection of lawful rights and interests of persons in court proceedings.”

“Thus, in the case of Cadajas v. People, we rejected the accused’s argument that the photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messages between him and the minor victim cannot be used against him, viz:”

“In this case, the photographs and conversations in the Facebook Messenger account that were obtained and used as evidence against petitioner, which he considers as fruit of the poisonous tree, were not obtained through the efforts of the police officers or any agent of the State. Rather, these were obtained by a private individual. Indeed, the rule governing the admissibility of evidence under Article III of the Constitution must affect only those pieces of evidence obtained by the State through its agents. It is these individuals who can flex government muscles and use government resources for a possible abuse. However, where private individuals are involved, for which their relationship is governed by the New Civil Code, the admissibility of evidence cannot be determined by the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”

“Here, the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were properly authenticated when AAA identified them in open court. As further pointed out by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda during the deliberations of this case, the DPA allows the processing of data and sensitive personal information where it relates to the determination of criminal liability of a data subject, such as a violation of Republic Act No. 10175 in relation to Republic Act No. 9775, and when necessary for the protection of lawful rights and interests of persons in court proceedings, as in this case where the communications and photos sought to be excluded in evidence to establish AAA’s legal claims before the prosecutor’s office and the courts.”

“Similarly, the communications, photos, and videos sought to be excluded by Rodriguez were submitted in evidence to prosecute him for violation of qualified trafficking and to establish AAA263603’s legal claims. Thus, there is no violation of the right to privacy.

“Neither can Rodriguez rely on Republic Act No. 4200, or the Anti-Wire Tapping Law. In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we have clarified that the prohibition therein only applies to instruments used for tapping the main line of a telephone:”

“An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as ‘tapping’ the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.”

In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we have clarified that the prohibition therein only applies to instruments used for tapping the main line of a telephone.

“Hence, the phrase ‘device or arrangement’ in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation.”

“By no stretch of the imagination can the recording of Skype conversations and pictures be of the same nature as ‘tapping the main line of a telephone.’ Thus, the trial court properly admitted and appreciated these pieces of evidence.”

The facts and ruling are from People of the Philippines v. Eul Vincent O. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 263603, 9 October 2023).