Almost two decades ago the economy was unexpectedly afflicted with an impending rice shortage. It was still early in the year and as was then normal, two rice harvest periods were scheduled. But even at that, projections indicated a severe shortage when arrayed against normal and consistent demand for the staple.

Where staples are concerned, price volatility is more a function of supply rather demand as the latter is essentially predictable and is based on relatively slow reactionary and price inelastic factors.

It’s all about elasticities. Demand can easily be forecasted compared to highly price elastic supply factors that are a function of many uncontrollable influences like climate, hoarding, smuggling, pestilence and, as is evident from recent fiascos on rice supply management, simple administrative stupidity.

Our lead agriculturist then under the Arroyo Cabinet, perhaps the most competent Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (DA) that we’ve ever had, seriously balked at knee-jerk suggestions that the solution to shortages was to import successively regardless of the variances between domestic rice prices and those imported from off-shore economies.

Never mind that others produced rice in ways that were not only efficient but in its relative efficiency, their technologies employed economies of scale achieved through mechanization within capital-intensive corporate farming structures that rendered Philippine production comparatively unviable.

Food self-sufficiency and security were constant themes in agricultural policy-making but when deeply analyzed these seemingly twin objectives did not always intersect. Trade-offs were necessary when one overrides the other. It’s all plain and simple economics. These necessitated prices based on competitive costs and margins — both of which are determined by the scarcity supply.

Rather than enrich traders who might have had a hand in subduing supply to bloat prices, as well as redirecting precious tax money to foreign rice producers, the then DA secretary in the Arroyo Cabinet decided that scarce domestic funds would be better spent on domestic rice farmers.

Indeed, why not spend limited cash resources on Filipino farmers instead of lining traders and hoarders pockets or using these for importations that enrich foreign producers where local producers can do a much better job given full government support?

The eventual upsides proved the DA Secretary correct. The final results of spending for a third harvest rather than importing not only reduced rice prices and increased supply but it had also led to substantial savings, to say nothing of financially empowering Filipino farmers tapped for the third harvest.

The foregoing is an example of an economically inclusive DA agenda that focused on the economic welfare of rice farmers rather than middlemen, traders and hoarders (“inventory management” as Emmanuel “Manny” Piñol calls the trade).

The same however, cannot be said of the DA today. To understand Piñol’s rice shortage palliatives that not only reduced domestic productivity, thereby financially afflicting farmers, but it likewise maintained higher prices to the benefit of traders and hoarders, allow us to review his agenda drawn upon being assigned the DA portfolio.

Other than cookie-cutter motherhood statements, Piñol offered some specificity on a mechanization program, post farm-gate distribution infrastructure, low interest micro-lending, agri-export standardization and small and medium scale after-farm training.

Most of these do not increase agricultural productivity given the current farmer and fishermen demographics.

Mechanization entails capital intensive equity investments and the aggregation of farms for economies of scale. Little, if any, has been done towards those. Micro-lending will not suffice.

Agriculture export standardization is a task for college students on their summer break. The rest in his agenda benefit post farm-gate players, traders and those Piñol calls inventory managers and do little to improve productivity at the farm level.

Upon deeply discerning Piñol’s petty palliatives in alleviating 2018’s rice shortages, we see its consistency with the general focus of his agenda. He isn’t looking after the welfare of his constituents in the field or in the high seas. His beneficiaries are city slickers and landlubbers — traders and middlemen who manage the “inventory.”

Isn’t it about time that Piñol is put out to pasture?