Sara’s resilience
The survey is not the final word on Duterte’s future; it is a snapshot of an evolving political reality. Much can still change as the trial unfolds and public hardships deepen or ease.

The survey is not the final word on Duterte’s future; it is a snapshot of an evolving political reality. Much can still change as the trial unfolds and public hardships deepen or ease.


House prosecutors criticized Vice President Sara Duterte’s public statements questioning her trust in the courts and…

Vice President Sara Duterte posted P360,000 in cash bail on Saturday, securing provisional liberty after a court issued…

Vice President Sara Duterte posted P360,000 bail Saturday for three counts of grave threats filed before the Quezon…

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We must lovingly and prudently correct each other when we err, forgive those who offend us, and ask forgiveness from…
This column is not a defense of the Vice President or an argument for her innocence. It explains why the recent Momentum Research survey produced results many critics of Sara Duterte find puzzling, and why impeachment, despite its gravity, has not translated into broad public rejection.
Vice President Sara Duterte’s 61.3-percent approval rating in the August 2026 National Momentum Survey shows a disconnect between Manila’s political battles and ordinary Filipinos’ concerns. Despite facing a Senate impeachment trial, Duterte gained support while her disapproval fell to 31.8 percent.
For those seeking her removal, these numbers are a paradox. But the survey suggests why impeachment has not seriously damaged her: low engagement with the trial, a persuasive persecution narrative, strong regional backing and dissatisfaction with the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.
First, impeachment has not become a daily concern. While about seven in 10 Filipinos are aware of the trial, only 17 percent closely follow updates. Most encounter it casually, so the legal skirmishes dominating Manila are not shaping public opinion as strongly as pro-impeachment lawmakers and some lawyers expected.
For many Filipinos, inflation, jobs, food prices, transport costs and household survival remain more urgent. The trial registers less as a national crisis than another clash among powerful families, weakening efforts to turn it into a defining moral issue.
Second, Duterte has framed the case as political persecution. By declaring early that she would run for president in 2028, she gave the impeachment trial a political frame. To supporters, it is less an accountability process than an attempt by rivals to block her path to power.
This narrative turns legal vulnerability into sympathy. Every aggressive question, prosecution document and public attack can be read by loyalists as proof of persecution, allowing Duterte to sidestep the allegations and reinforce her embattled image.
The recent arrest warrant over Duterte’s alleged threats against the First Couple and the former House Speaker may further feed that perception, especially among supporters inclined to see legal action against her as politically motivated.
That perception is sharpened by a question Duterte’s camp can exploit: if the administration can act forcefully against her, why not with the same urgency toward allies linked to the flood control controversy raised in the President’s 2025 State of the Nation Address?
With corruption ranking as the top issue voters want addressed at 47.4 percent, the contrast strengthens her claim of selective accountability.
Third, regional backing protects Duterte’s national numbers. In Metro Manila, much of Luzon, and the Visayas, the merits of the case appear to carry more weight. But in Mindanao, many supporters view the trial through regional loyalty, shared identity and resentment toward Manila.
Accusations against Sara Duterte can feel less like accountability than another attack from the imperial capital.
That regional support cushions her weaknesses elsewhere and gives her a strong national base. It also explains why impeachment may harden, rather than fracture, her coalition.
Finally, Duterte benefits from contrast. The same survey shows President Marcos with a 57.4-percent disapproval rating, making her appear to many voters as the most visible alternative to an unpopular status quo.
Her advantage rests on loyalty, frustration with unmet economic promises, and the perception that parts of the traditional opposition are cooperating with Malacañang instead of offering a distinct alternative.
Her lead in 2028 presidential preference surveys reinforces this position. With 45.8 percent naming her their top choice — well ahead of Leni Robredo and Raffy Tulfo — supporters see impeachment as an effort to derail a likely presidential bid, not an impartial search for accountability.
The survey is not the final word on Duterte’s future; it is a snapshot of an evolving political reality. Much can still change as the trial unfolds and public hardships deepen or ease.
For now, however, it explains her resilience: many voters remain loosely engaged with impeachment, her persecution narrative still resonates, Mindanao anchors her support, and Marcos’ weakness makes her the clearest alternative center of power.
Legally, impeachment may still threaten her. Politically, it has not broken the coalition that could carry her toward 2028.