The Supreme Court (SC) has clarified two key rules governing cyber libel, affirming that the offense prescribes one year from discovery while ruling that prosecutors must prove actual malice beyond reasonable doubt to secure a conviction.

In a resolution written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting dated 8 April 2026 but released only Saturday, the SC en banc denied separate motions for reconsideration filed by Berteni Cataluña Causing and the Office of the Solicitor General, affirming that cyber libel prescribes one year from the time the offense is discovered.

The case stemmed from a 2020 complaint filed by Cotabato Second District Rep. Ferdinand L. Hernandez against Causing over Facebook posts accusing Hernandez of pocketing more than P200 million in relief goods intended for Marawi victims.

Hernandez said he discovered the posts on 4 February and 29 April 2019.

The Regional Trial Court had ruled that cyber libel prescribes in 12 years under Republic Act 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The SC later clarified that the one-year period under the Revised Penal Code applies because cyber libel is not a separate crime but libel committed through a computer system.

The OSG argued that cyber libel should instead prescribe in 15 years under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, citing an earlier unsigned resolution in Tolentino v People. Causing, meanwhile, argued that prescription should begin upon publication rather than discovery.

The SC rejected both arguments, saying no law excludes cyber libel from the one-year prescriptive period for written libel. It also said laws on prescription must be interpreted in favor of the accused when unclear.

The Court further ruled that publication does not automatically mean the offended party saw an online post, noting that access may depend on privacy settings, internet access and social media connections.

It also said the unsigned Tolentino resolution, which stated that cyber libel prescribes in 15 years, binds only the parties in that case and not Causing.

Actual malice

In a separate decision, the SC Second Division acquitted Jade Karla Tan of cyber libel after finding that prosecutors failed to prove actual malice in her Facebook posts accusing then-Catanauan, Quezon, Mayor Ramon A. Orfanel of demanding “padulas” in exchange for permits.

The 16-page decision, written by Associate Justice Jhosep Lopez, reversed Tan’s conviction by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

The SC said cyber libel has the same elements as traditional libel under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code: an allegation of a discreditable act or condition, publication, identification of the person defamed and malice.

The Court found the fourth element lacking, stressing that actual malice exists when a statement is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard for whether it is false.

“The prosecution did not show that actual malice attended petitioner’s declarations,” the Court said, adding that it was not established whether Tan knew the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for their truth.

The SC also stressed that criminal libel prosecutions must respect freedom of expression, citing Daquer v. People, which held that when the complainant is a public officer, the burden of proving actual malice rests on the complainant.

Given the constitutional presumption of innocence, the Court ruled that acquittal was warranted.