SC: Facebook posts can warrant stiffer penalties under Cybercrime Law

The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that alleging psychological violence was committed through Facebook is sufficient to establish the use of information and communications technology (ICT) as a qualifying circumstance that may warrant a stiffer penalty under the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

In a resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and dated 29 June 2026, the SC's First Division affirmed, with modification, its 22 October 2025 decision upholding the conviction of an individual for committing psychological violence against his former girlfriend through defamatory Facebook posts.

The High Court, however, increased the penalty by one degree after ruling that the offense was committed through Facebook, as sufficiently alleged in the criminal information and established during trial.

The Court said that if the use of ICT is properly alleged and proven, the offender becomes liable for the higher penalty under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.

Records showed that the accused and the victim were in a relationship for three years and had a daughter together. Although the accused proposed marriage after the victim became pregnant, she declined because of problems in their relationship and eventually raised their child on her own.

The Court said the victim later blocked the accused from her social media accounts after he allegedly grabbed and groped her during a visit with their daughter.

Years later, the victim's siblings received a Facebook Messenger message from an account they recognized as belonging to the accused, blaming her for allegedly causing his mother to suffer a heart attack.

The following day, the victim learned that the same account had posted public statements on Facebook calling her a "dirty woman" and an "animal," while also threatening to assault her. Similar insults were also posted in the comments section.

Fearing for her safety, the victim filed a complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

During trial, prosecutors presented screenshots of the Facebook posts. The victim testified that she had originally created the Facebook account for the accused, who later became its sole user.

Her two siblings likewise testified that they had regularly communicated with the accused through the same account.

The accused denied making the posts, although he admitted that the profile photo used on the account showed himself and one of his children with his current live-in partner. He claimed someone could have created a fake account using his photograph and argued that he could not have posted the messages because he was working as a waiter at the time and had no access to his phone.

Both the Family Court and the Court of Appeals rejected his defense, finding that the prosecution had sufficiently established his identity as the account user.

Affirming those findings, the Supreme Court held that the allegation that the psychological violence was committed through Facebook was enough to invoke the qualifying circumstance under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, resulting in a higher penalty upon conviction.