In the pursuit of justice, the State may offer leniency to an accused in exchange for truthful testimony against their co-conspirators. This principle underlies the concept of a state witness — a crucial tool in dismantling criminal conspiracies. However, the role of a state witness is not a privilege to be demanded; it is a covenant built upon full cooperation, credibility, and voluntary participation. An uncooperative witness cannot, and should not, be granted this status.

Under Rule 119, Section 17 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, several requisites must be met before an accused can become a state witness. Chief among these are: that the testimony is absolutely necessary, that there is no other direct evidence available for the prosecution, and that the witness appears to be the least guilty among the accused.

Yet, beneath these legal conditions lies an indispensable moral and practical requirement — cooperation. A witness who refuses to disclose information, evades questioning, or withholds key evidence destroys the very basis upon which the State extends immunity.

Cooperation is the lifeblood of testimonial credibility. The law does not intend to reward silence or obstinacy; it seeks truth through candor and consistency. A state witness must be willing to “come clean,” admitting their participation and revealing the full picture of the crime. Without this willingness, the prosecution cannot rely on the testimony as truthful or indispensable. Granting immunity to an uncooperative person undermines the integrity of the justice system — it rewards defiance rather than truth, and weakens the case it seeks to strengthen.

The case of the Discayas in the ongoing flood control corruption investigations exemplifies this principle. The couple, allegedly central figures in the diversion of funds and falsification of flood control projects, were initially considered potential state witnesses. Their proximity to the transactions, knowledge of the financial flows, and connections to contractors would have been pivotal in establishing the broader conspiracy involving public officials and private entities.

However, their inconsistent statements, refusal to turn over key documents, and failure to cooperate fully with investigators rendered them unreliable.

Had the Office of the Ombudsman or the DoJ conferred upon them the protection and privileges of state witnesses despite this behavior, it would have set a dangerous precedent — that selective truth-telling or strategic silence can still earn immunity. Justice demands the opposite. Only those who willingly, truthfully, and completely assist the State deserve the protection it offers.

In sum, a state witness is not merely a participant turned informant; he or she is an agent of truth. The Discayas’ uncooperative stance disqualifies them from this role, reaffirming a timeless principle — that immunity is earned by honesty, not withheld through convenience.