Dishonored, then digital
The most significant innovation is the Court’s formal recognition of electronic service — a mode attuned to modern communications.

The most significant innovation is the Court’s formal recognition of electronic service — a mode attuned to modern communications.

Technology is often villainized in the courtroom: a tool for hatching scams, falsifying evidence, or evading liability. But in Arnel and Marivic Carlos v. People of the Philippines and Tire Star Inc. (GR 277047, 15 April 2026), the Supreme Court En Banc, through Associate Justice Samuel Gaerlan, showed that digital tools can just as easily serve justice by closing a loophole that allows check issuers to dodge liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), or the Anti-Bouncing Check Law.
The petitioners were customers of a tire company, purchasing tires on credit and paying through postdated checks. Six of these checks, worth a total of P609,972.58, were dishonored for “Account Closed.” When the company’s messenger personally served a demand letter with notice of dishonor at the petitioners’ store, they refused to receive it, prompting the messenger to have an employee accept and sign for it instead. The petitioners were convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), and that conviction was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA).
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that they never received the notice of dishonor for the checks they issued. The Court rejected this defense. It reiterated that a B.P. 22 violation is complete once an issuer knowingly issues a check without sufficient funds, the check is dishonored, and the issuer fails to settle within five banking days from receipt of notice. A mere denial of receipt cannot defeat liability. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade the law simply by refusing or denying receipt of the notice.
The Court then laid down the standard modes of serving the notice of dishonor. Personal service upon the drawer remains the primary mode, with a sworn affidavit — and, where feasible, photo or video documentation — proving the circumstances of service. If personal service is impracticable, registered mail may be resorted to, supported by an affidavit and authenticated registry receipts and return cards.
The most significant innovation, however, is the Court’s formal recognition of electronic service — a mode attuned to modern communications. Electronic means, such as email and messaging applications, may now be resorted to as a mode of service. It may be a primary mode if the issuer’s email address was officially communicated to the payee, or a substituted mode where it is clearly shown that the issuer refuses to receive the notice. In the latter case, notice must be sent within 24 hours from the last failed attempt, accompanied by a sworn affidavit and preserved proof such as screenshots, delivery or read receipts, and chat histories.
Crucially, the Court held that a bare denial of receipt cannot invalidate electronic service either. To succeed, an issuer must prove that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place of service — a high bar intended to prevent recipients from gaming the system by simply claiming that they never saw the message.
Applying these guidelines, the Court found that the petitioners neither disputed the affidavit of service nor proved that they could not have been at their office when service was attempted. Their conviction, together with the P609,972.58 civil liability plus interest, was affirmed.
This case is a timely reminder that, as commerce moves increasingly online, the law must move with it. Technology need not be seen only as a tool for evasion; it can just as easily be a tool for justice.