An employee was subjected to working conditions she found unbearable during her pregnancy. This strained her relationship with her employer. Unable to cope with the situation, she resigned.

Thereafter, she filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The labor arbiter dismissed her complaint.

The NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s ruling and declared that she had been constructively dismissed.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the NLRC, declaring that she had resigned; ergo, there was no constructive dismissal. The employee elevated the case to the Supreme Court, seeking a reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Supreme court ruled in her favor. It decreed:

“Resignation is defined as ‘the formal relinquishment of a position or office.’ Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the rule is that it is the employer, not the employee, who bears the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary.

“Moreover, the employer cannot simply rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. Instead, the employer must show by clear, positive, and convincing evidence that the resignation was indeed voluntary. This is in line with the State’s policy of affording greater protection to labor, a constitutionally protected social class.”

“In Pascua v. Bankwise Inc., the Court enunciated: ‘The employer has the burden of proving, in illegal dismissal cases, that the employee was dismissed for a just or authorized cause. Even if the employer claims that the employee resigned, the employer still has the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary.” “’It is a constructive dismissal when resignation was made under compulsion or under circumstances approximating compulsion, such as when an employee’s act of handing in his [or her] resignation was a reaction to circumstances leaving him [or her] no alternative but to resign.’

“Curiously, the CA, despite citing the case of Pascua, held that the burden of proof fell on the petitioner, the employee, instead of the employer-respondent. The CA then declared that the petitioner voluntarily and unconditionally resigned based solely on the first line of her resignation letter, which read: ‘Dear Ms. Aliaa Moussa: I am writing this letter to inform you of my decision to resign immediately from my position as a Sr. Training Specialist ...’

“However, for a resignation to be considered valid, the following must concur: (1) an intent to relinquish the position; and (2) the overt act of relinquishment. Because intent is a mental state, it can only be determined by observing the person’s actions.

“The Court must therefore examine the resignation letter in its entirety and delve into the ‘totality of circumstances’ of the case. It must take into consideration the actions of the employee before and after the alleged resignation to determine whether the employee truly intended to resign from employment.

“Applied to the case, while the petitioner, in the first line of her resignation letter, expressed her desire to resign immediately, the tenor of the succeeding 12 or more lines unmistakably showed that she ‘was left with no option but to leave’ because of pregnancy discrimination. Worse, contrary to the CA’s declaration that the resignation was unconditional, the last line of the petitioner’s letter expressly stated that her resignation was ‘without prejudice to the appropriate legal remedies which I may resort to in accordance with law.’

“Based on the full text of the resignation letter alone, it is clear that the petitioner’s resignation was not voluntary. Respondent et al. argued that there could be no constructive dismissal for the following reasons: (1) the petitioner accepted the transfers to the Clark office and the Tarlac office, and the transfers were an exercise of management prerogative; (2) as she retained her position, there was no demotion in rank or diminution in pay; and (3) it provided the petitioner with hotel accommodations.

“Respondent et al.’s arguments are absurd. First, it is well to stress that employers, such as the respondent, bear the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is based on a valid and legitimate ground; otherwise, the transfer is deemed a constructive dismissal.

“Second, constructive dismissal or constructive discharge exists ‘when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as the offer of employment involves a demotion in rank or diminution in pay.’ It likewise exists where ‘an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him [or her] except to forego his [or her] continued employment.’

“Stated otherwise, even without a demotion in rank or diminution in pay, there may still be constructive dismissal in cases where the employee was forced to resign because of discrimination.

“Third, the Supreme Court, as the prime duty bearer and the last bulwark of justice and democracy, is constitutionally mandated to protect working women against all forms of discrimination and to ensure that they enjoy decent work environments, with due regard for their maternal functions.

“To the Court’s mind, the circumstances, taken collectively, demonstrate respondent et al.’s discrimination against the petitioner on account of her pregnancy. Such discrimination constitutes not only constructive dismissal but also a violation of the Magna Carta of Women.”

The facts and the redacted portions of the decision are from SC GR 262564 (6 August 2025).