The Municipal Circuit Trial Court convicted Israel, and the conviction was subsequently affirmed by both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that the gestures could only reasonably be interpreted as threats of future bodily harm directed at Navez.
Before the Supreme Court, Israel argued that Article 282 contemplates only verbal or written threats and does not extend to non-verbal gestures. He further maintained that he never intended to threaten Navez and that his actions were merely spontaneous expressions of displeasure arising from the near collision.
The Court ultimately acquitted Israel. It found that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he intended to intimidate or threaten Navez. The gestures, while disturbing and offensive, were deemed impulsive reactions made in the heat of the moment rather than deliberate attempts to instill fear.
Significantly, however, the Court rejected Israel’s argument that non-verbal gestures fall outside the ambit of Article 282. The provision penalizes any person who threatens another with the infliction upon the person, honor, or property of a wrong amounting to a crime.
According to the Court, what the law punishes is the communication of a threat made with the intent to intimidate. The mode of communication is immaterial. Although the second paragraph of Article 282 expressly refers to verbal threats, nothing in the law excludes threatening gestures from its coverage.