Belief in good faith upholds the marriage
To the Supreme Court’s mind, even assuming that she was able to prove that the judge was really someone else, the Highest Court would still maintain that the marriage was valid.

Remember what I wrote about last week? It was a case of a wife who asked the court to declare her marriage to her husband null and void. Her ground was that the officiating officer had no authority to solemnize marriages. This was so because the judge, a person authorized by the Family Code to solemnize marriages, was not the actual judge she thought was performing the wedding, but someone else.
So all throughout her marriage, she was under the firm belief that the ceremony was conducted by the person she thought was the judge. It was only 27 years later that she found out the judge was someone else.
It was her counsel, from whom she sought advice about obtaining a marital dissolution, who informed her about it. And it was precisely this ground that the wife used to have her marriage declared null.
Unfortunately, the court, after a trial, did not grant her request. It opined that, assuming that the judge was really someone else, the petitioner was not able to present the proper quantum of evidence to show that indeed that person was not the supposed judge.
Even the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court. When she brought the matter to the Supreme Court, the latter sustained the findings of the lower court. In fact, to the Supreme Court’s mind, even assuming that she was able to prove that the judge was really someone else, the Highest Court would still maintain that the marriage was valid.
Here is its discussion on the matter. “In any case, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the person who solemnized the marriage was not Judge De Gracia, the marriage is still valid because the case falls under Article 35(2) of the Family Code.
“Article 35(2) of the Family Code provides that marriages officiated by a person with no legal authority are considered void, except if one or both parties to the marriage believed in good faith that the officer had legal authority to solemnize the marriage. Here, the records show that the petitioner had always believed in good faith, since the inception of her marriage in the year 1990, that the solemnizing officer was Judge De Gracia, a person who had the legal authority to solemnize the marriage.
“She had never doubted the authority of the solemnizing officer. It was only in 2017 that she sought legal advice on how to be legally separated from her husband, wherein she was notified by her lawyer that Judge De Gracia was not the actual person who officiated their marriage.
“However, as discussed, petitioner and Atty. Cunanan palpably failed to establish the veracity of their allegations. Thus, the petitioner’s case falls under the exception of void marriages as provided in Article 35(2) of the Family Code. Petitioner’s marriage with private respondent is valid owing to her genuine belief, in good faith, that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to officiate her marriage with private respondent.”
Personally, this is the more important part of the decision. The belief in good faith. This is the guiding rule. It is clear that when both or even just one of the parties firmly believed that the officiating officer had sufficient authority to perform the ceremony, then the validity of the marriage is upheld.
This is even if the officiating officer actually had no authority. It is the belief that determines the validity. It is not the fault of the parties that the officer did not have the power. The marrying parties should not be faulted for that. They, however, should have that genuine belief, one in good faith, that he had authority.
What if, you may ask, a party believes in the officer’s authority but entertains doubt? Will that still be enough to hold the marriage valid? It behooves the party entertaining that doubt to probe and confirm the person’s authority. Otherwise, such would no longer be belief in good faith.
The facts and the redacted portion of the quoted decision are from G.R. 267998 (23 April 2025).
