There seems to be no end in sight to the rising tension in the West Philippine Sea between Beijing and Manila, how it could be deescalated to achieve an equilibrium. Are things moving toward a replication of the Scarborough standoff of April 2012? Will another bureaucrat conveniently announce, however prematurely, a “stalemate?” Will there be backdoor negotiations where a senator will be taken to task?

What lessons, if any, has officialdom learned from past mistakes? Or will this simply come down to a case of winning the battle but losing the war? The existential patterns are the same. Until when will the rigmarole really stop being a status quo ante? Perhaps let us roll out what our mistakes were that made us lose Scarborough Shoal, aka Bajo de Masinloc?

It might be instructive to mention the conclusions drawn from that standoff. According to Michael Green et al., these are as follows: 1) the deployment of a naval frigate, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, helped trigger the standoff; 2) poor coordination within and between the respective bureaucracies (Beijing and Manila); 3) closer US-Philippine coordination might have provided a beneficial mix of reassurance and restraint early in the crisis.

Until then, the specter of a regional phenomenon cascading beyond geopolitical frontiers could not be far removed. The West Philippine Sea feud pitting China and the Philippines has gained adherents, nay, detractors through the vicious exchange of conflicting narratives, dragging in countries within and beyond the contested ocean territories to militate against a rising China.

The contest over sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction produced principal claimants whose worldviews are diametrically opposed, consequently putting much strain on their respective foreign policies, human rights, peace and security agendas.

Perhaps, it’s time to do a Prince System analysis of this unsettling issue by addressing the question, viz., what joint development pathway strategy could instead be tried as a desirable way forward besides perhaps Vietnam’s hedging methodical template? Could there be a universal big tent under which the conflict is subsumed to prevent the specter of a Sino-Philippine war and tilt the balance of power that has long made the United States of America the world’s policeman?

Something appears to be missing in the causality chain given that the much-professed arguments raised against China, like a rules-based global order or modern international law, are thrown out the window. When the diplomatic route holds no key for a more positive resolution of conflict, we should then take a more critical look at the whys and wherefores of this contemporary flashpoint that might pose a threat beyond a regional scale which likewise tends to rationalize, even mainstream, an oblique grey zone stratagem to the claimants’ mutual peril.

Besides, there are many more things to be done and the government simply cannot keep pace with China’s unparalleled transformation as an emerging maritime power in this part of the region. Suffice it to say, our resolve for third-party arbitration “internationalizing” the crisis, otherwise breaking any consensus reached, the breakdown of negotiations or dialogue, maximizing US involvement along with its allies — are all a cobbled-together arrangement without a clear beneficial outcome.

It will be unfortunate if the acquired US-made missile system would just be another trigger for China to respond strategically once hell breaks loose. Think, than tank!