Consent is not collusion
By distinguishing consent from collusion, the Court faithfully protects both the integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the individuals before it.
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By distinguishing consent from collusion, the Court faithfully protects both the integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the individuals before it.
Marriage occupies a unique place in both law and society. For Catholics, it is more than a civil contract; it is a sacred covenant founded on fidelity, mutual self-giving and openness to family life.
Our Constitution likewise recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family. Yet while the law zealously protects marriage, it also recognizes that there are exceptional cases in which what appeared to be a valid marriage was, in truth, void from the very beginning.
The Supreme Court recently revisited this delicate balance in Republic of the Philippines v. Ramoran-Wong and Wong (GR 276986, 3 February 2026). Writing for the Court, Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh clarified that a husband and wife’s mutual desire to end their marriage does not, by itself, constitute collusion in a petition for the declaration of nullity.
The case arose from a petition filed by the wife seeking to have her marriage declared void on the ground of her husband’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The evidence showed that even before and during the marriage, the husband was unemployed, violent, addicted to cockfighting, alcohol, illegal drugs and gambling, and had even fathered an illegitimate child.
Although the husband did not contest the petition and his father admitted that he was willing to have the marriage declared void, the Office of the Solicitor General insisted that these circumstances indicated collusion.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument.
The Court explained that collusion is not established simply because both spouses agree that their marriage has failed. Collusion involves a secret agreement to deceive the court by fabricating evidence, suppressing defenses or otherwise securing a favorable judgment through fraud. Mere consent to the declaration of nullity is not deception. Often, it is simply an honest acknowledgment that the marital relationship has long ceased to exist in any meaningful sense.
On the merits, the Court likewise affirmed the declaration of nullity after finding clear and convincing evidence that the husband’s psychological incapacity existed before the marriage, was grave enough to prevent him from fulfilling the essential obligations of marriage, and was incurable in the legal sense.
The decision concludes with a poignant reminder that marriage should be “a sanctuary” characterized by mutual respect, care and emotional safety — not a prison that perpetuates suffering.
This pronouncement deserves thoughtful reflection. The Church continues to proclaim the sanctity and permanence of marriage, encouraging spouses to persevere through life’s ordinary trials with faith, charity and grace. At the same time, neither the Church nor the State teaches that people should remain trapped in relationships that were fundamentally defective from the very beginning.
It is equally important to remember that a declaration of nullity is not the Catholic equivalent of divorce. It does not dissolve a valid marriage; rather, it is a legal determination that an essential requirement for a valid marital union was absent from its inception. The State’s constitutional duty to protect marriage is therefore not diminished by recognizing nullity where the law so requires.
By distinguishing consent from collusion, the Court faithfully protects both the integrity of judicial proceedings and the dignity of the individuals before it. In doing so, it reminds us that defending the institution of marriage and dispensing justice are not conflicting objectives. When guided by truth, they ultimately serve the same noble end.
