Limits of rule-making

Limits of rule-making | Daily Tribune

The case arose from the claim of Petronilo B. Laroco, whose daughter, Cristie, was a public school teacher. She rendered 13 years of government service and paid GSIS premiums for 12 years before passing away. She died single and without children, leaving her father as her only heir.

Laroco applied for survivorship benefits under the GSIS law. His claim, however, was denied on the basis of Section 24.2.2 of the IRR of Republic Act 8291. Under this provision, when a member had rendered less than 15 years of service, survivorship benefits could be granted only to primary beneficiaries, such as a surviving spouse or children.

Since Cristie left neither, GSIS concluded that no survivorship benefits could be awarded. The GSIS Board of Trustees affirmed the denial, and the Court of Appeals sustained the agency’s position.

Before the Supreme Court, Laroco argued that Section 24.2.2 of the IRR unlawfully amended Republic Act 8291 by imposing a requirement that Congress itself did not provide. GSIS, on the other hand, maintained that it possessed rule-making authority to promulgate regulations implementing the law.

The Supreme Court agreed with Laroco.

The Court pointed out that Section 21(c) of Republic Act 8291 expressly provides that, in the absence of a primary beneficiary, a secondary beneficiary may receive survivorship benefits if “the member is in the service at the time of his death and has at least three years of service.” The statute nowhere requires 15 years of service.

By introducing that additional condition, Section 24.2.2 of the IRR effectively amended the law rather than merely implementing it.

GSIS argued that the regulation was intended to address what it perceived as an inequity between members who had rendered 15 years of service and those who had served for a shorter period.

The Court acknowledged the policy concern but emphasized that administrative agencies cannot remedy perceived gaps in legislation by rewriting statutory provisions through administrative regulations. The authority to enact, amend, or revise the law belongs exclusively to Congress.

The Court reiterated the settled principle that implementing rules must remain consistent with the statute they seek to enforce. Administrative regulations may clarify or carry out legislative intent, but they cannot enlarge, restrict, or modify the law itself. Whenever an administrative rule conflicts with the statute, the law must prevail.

Equally significant, the Court stressed that social legislation such as the GSIS Act is enacted precisely to protect government employees and their beneficiaries. Consistent with this protective purpose, doubts in the interpretation of the law should generally be resolved in favor of those whom the statute seeks to benefit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared Section 24.2.2 of the IRR invalid, directed the GSIS to refrain from implementing the provision, and ordered the computation and payment of Laroco’s survivorship benefits.

The Laroco decision serves as a timely reminder that rule-making authority is not law-making authority. Administrative agencies perform an indispensable role in implementing legislation, but they must always act within the boundaries established by Congress.

When administrative regulations alter the substance of a statute, they cease to be instruments of implementation and become exercises of unauthorized legislation. In our constitutional system, that line cannot be crossed.