The Senate has been at the center of political action, drama, and risk in recent weeks. If one looks at it, the conflict has similarities to the ongoing US/Israel-Iran war in the sense that we have a shooting, a blockade, attempts at negotiations and ultimately an impasse.
And just like the Middle East conflict, we can model the Philippine Senate using game theory (GT) to analyze and predict outcomes.
GT is a branch of economics that looks at mathematical frameworks or models of decision-making. The games are analyzed with math. It is very different from sports games where training, muscles, and chance may play a larger role in the outcome. Nevertheless, just like sports, games in GT look at who wins and who loses.
The Senate is currently paralyzed by the dual claims of leadership, threats to the security of its members due to gunfire and arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court (ICC), and more recently, cyberattacks on its website.
Based on reports, there are two blocs competing in the Senate, but if you think about it there are probably three or even four blocs in the chamber. When it comes to claiming the Senate presidency, however, there seems to be only two alliances. This makes it more in scope with the first game theory model — the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).
Under the PD, two criminals are interrogated separately and cannot communicate with each other. The choices are to confess (defect) or stay silent (cooperate). Even though it is in their collective interest to cooperate, the model predicts that individuals acting in their self-interest will choose to defect and make it worse for the players collectively.
Senators supporting either side are likely facing the same dilemma. Do I cooperate or defect to the other camp? However, this decision is just one of several games to be played in 2026. The first game is for control of the Senate leadership, and we have already seen the PD at work as evidenced by the defection of one senator that enabled the shift in leadership to a new Senate president. The current impasse reflects this equilibrium.
We expect another game to be played soon — the impeachment of the Vice President. In GT, when you play several games, you begin to learn that the best (or to be more precise, most optimal) solution or strategy is to cooperate.
It is in the interest of the blocs to cooperate, particularly if the numbers (depending on the prosecution or defense perspectives) are not there or are at risk. The absence of one or two senators plus the threat of new ICC arrest warrants can alter the impeachment math and add to the uncertainty of the verdict, whatever it may be.
Even with a fragmentation, the different blocs need to be comfortable playing these games.
After all, we have many pending bills and legislative issues that need a fully functioning Senate.
In other words, alliances need to be fluid when it comes to legislative issues that concern non-divisive reforms such as confirmations and health or critical issues such as a fiscal emergency. While games at the Senate can hold the economy hostage, it should not be the case because Filipinos and the world are watching.
While there are two major blocs, the dilemma is more serious for minor blocs that hold the swing votes or maintain fluid positions. The key considerations are how to maximize or minimize the strategic value or loss of your vote. Strategic value may be different from one player to another. Whatever it may be for each senator, whether it is a desired committee leadership or protection/security, PD expects players to decide to maximize their self-interests.
This is one of the saddest things about Game Theory. The frameworks assume that humans are selfish. While we are civilized and maintain laws to govern society, when it boils down to individual decisions, our self-centered nature prevails. When we see this behavior in our leaders in full display, we find ourselves asking: is this as good as it gets for Filipinos?
(Jose Mari Lacson is the Director and Head of Macroeconomics and Impact Investing at ATR Asset Management. He has a PhD in Economics from De La Salle University.)
