The Supreme Court (SC) has clarified that courts must apply the rules on mitigating and aggravating circumstances in cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide involving motor vehicles, a ruling that led to the reduced sentence of a driver convicted over a fatal road accident.

In a decision penned by Antonio Kho Jr., the SC En Banc upheld the conviction of Noli Ilon for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but lowered his prison term after recognizing his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.

The case stemmed from a road accident in which Ilon, while driving his employer’s car near an intersection, struck a trisikad driven by Lee de la Cruz, who had stopped to let a passenger alight. 

The collision threw de la Cruz onto the vehicle’s hood before he fell onto the road and was run over. He later died in the hospital.

Ilon surrendered to authorities and admitted he was driving the vehicle, although he claimed he had been traveling at a normal speed and tried to avoid the trisikad after it allegedly moved toward the center of the road.

Both the Municipal Trial Court in Cities and the Regional Trial Court found Ilon guilty, ruling that he failed to exercise proper caution by accelerating instead of slowing down near an intersection. 

The Court of Appeals (CA) later affirmed the conviction and increased the penalty, citing his alleged failure to assist the victim after the crash.

Before the SC, Ilon argued that de la Cruz’s own negligence contributed to the accident. 

The High Court rejected the defense, stressing that motorists are required under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code to drive at a reasonable speed, especially near intersections.

The Court noted that Ilon himself admitted he did not slow down as he approached the intersection and even increased his speed, circumstances that directly led to the collision.

However, the SC ruled that Ilon’s voluntary surrender should reduce his sentence. 

It clarified that while Article 365 generally gives trial courts discretion in imposing penalties for reckless imprudence, cases involving death caused by motor vehicles are treated differently and must follow Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs the application of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

The tribunal traced legislative amendments to the law, from the 1932 Revised Motor Vehicle Law to later revisions under Batas Pambansa Blg. 398, and found that Congress consistently intended such cases to fall under Article 64.

The SC also ruled that Ilon’s alleged failure to render assistance to the victim could not be appreciated against him because it was not specifically alleged in the Information, citing the constitutional right of an accused person to be informed of the charges filed against them.

The Court further pointed out what it described as an inconsistency in the law, noting that reckless imprudence cases involving homicide with motor vehicles may benefit from mitigating circumstances, while similar cases involving serious physical injuries or property damage remain largely subject to judicial discretion.

Because of this, the SC directed that copies of the ruling be furnished to the Office of the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives for possible legislative action.

Ilon was ultimately sentenced to a prison term of up to two years and four months and ordered to pay the heirs of de la Cruz more than P629,000 in damages.

In a separate concurring opinion, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen said piecemeal amendments to the Revised Penal Code have created inconsistencies in criminal law and urged lawmakers to consolidate criminal provisions into a single unified code.