Strategic hypocrisy
If burden-sharing is the principle, then reciprocity, not only in defense, but in economic survivability, should follow.
Text size
Share
Daily TribuneIf burden-sharing is the principle, then reciprocity, not only in defense, but in economic survivability, should follow.
Share
The contradiction at the heart of Western sanctions policy becomes clearest when one follows the trade flows rather than the rhetoric.
The EU reduced, not eliminated, its dependence on Russian commodities. Russian natural gas still accounts for a meaningful share of the EU supply, while oil continues to reach Hungary and Slovakia through pipeline exemptions. France, Belgium and the Netherlands remain active importers of Russian LNG, sometimes at a discount.
Beyond energy, Europe continues to rely on Russian fertilizer, metals such as nickel and aluminum, and even nuclear fuel and uranium services — inputs critical to agriculture, heavy industry and power generation.
In Asia, China and India dominate purchases of Russian crude, while Turkey imports significant volumes of oil products and natural gas, positioning itself as a regional hub. Advanced economies like South Korea continue to bring in coal and energy inputs as needed. These are not marginal transactions; they are central to national energy strategies built on discounted supply.
Even the United States remains indirectly entangled, maintaining imports of Russian nuclear fuel and uranium services while global supply chains circulate refined fuels derived from Russian crude. Allies such as the United Kingdom have likewise consumed such products via intermediaries, illustrating how sanctions often reroute trade rather than end it.
Yet this pragmatic flexibility is rarely extended to smaller allies. Countries like the Philippines are warned against procuring Russian oil, gas, and fertilizer under the shadow of secondary sanctions and potential loss of economic and security assistance. The result is a dual standard: what is tolerated as a necessity for major economies is framed as a transgression for developing ones.
This is not merely hypocrisy — it is structural realism disguised as principle.
The Philippines today sits at the front line of a deepening geopolitical contest in the Indo-Pacific.
Under EDCA, Manila now hosts nine facilities accessible to US forces — a significant expansion of its security footprint aligned with Washington’s regional posture. This is not a symbolic concession — it is a material contribution to alliance architecture.
If burden-sharing is the principle, then reciprocity, not only in defense, but in economic survivability, should follow.
The Philippines remains structurally dependent on imported energy and agricultural inputs. Oil, petroleum products and fertilizer are not optional commodities; they are foundational to control inflation, for food security and industrial stability.
When global prices spike, it is developing economies like the Philippines that absorb the sharpest shocks. Manila operates within a far narrower policy space shaped by alliance expectations and its reliance on Western markets.
This asymmetry raises a legitimate question: if the Philippines is expected to assume strategic risks on behalf of an alliance, should it not also be afforded strategic flexibility to safeguard its domestic economy?
A narrowly tailored, transparent policy allowing the importation of discounted Russian commodities for domestic stabilization could be justified on three grounds:
First, economic necessity. Lower input costs directly temper inflation, stabilize electricity prices and protect agricultural productivity.
Second, precedent. Major economies — including US partners — continue to access Russian commodities through exemptions, intermediaries, or restructured contracts.
Third, proportionality. The Philippines’ scale of imports would be marginal in global terms but materially significant domestically,
The constraint is often framed in financial terms. Russia’s partial exclusion from SWIFT complicates transactions, pushing countries to explore alternatives such as local currency settlements, intermediary banking arrangements, or systems like Cross-Border Interbank Payment System.
While such mechanisms exist, they are neither seamless nor risk-free, carrying legal, financial, and reputational exposure—including the possibility of secondary sanctions. The issue, therefore, is not the absence of mechanisms, but the cost of using them.
That reality underscores the need to move the discussion away from improvised workarounds and toward policy clarity with allies. If the United States and its partners regard the Philippines as a critical strategic node, then space must be created for narrowly defined economic exceptions that reflect its vulnerabilities as an energy-importing economy.
Strategic alignment should not demand economic rigidity. A durable alliance recognizes that security cooperation and economic resilience are mutually reinforcing. Enabling calibrated access to discounted inputs under transparent conditions would not meaningfully erode sanctions regimes, but it would materially strengthen a partner whose stability is itself a strategic asset.
