SMAI, a subsidiary of diversified giant San Miguel Corp., acquired the NSLF from PhilEco through an expropriation in 2023.
WORK for soil covering and smothering operations continues at the Navotas Sanitary Landfill site after the recent huge fire in the area.
PHOTOGRAPH courtesy of Navotas DRRMO
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Corporate infrastructure ambitions over environmental safety, public health, and due process for the legitimate operator, effectively amounting to a state-assisted land grab, were reflected in San Miguel Aerocity Inc.’s (SMAI) recent aggressive land acquisitions.
SMAI, a subsidiary of diversified giant San Miguel Corp. (SMC), acquired the 28.6-hectare Navotas Sanitary Landfill Facility (NSLF) from Phil. Ecology Systems Corp. (PhilEco) through an expropriation in 2023.
After a disastrous fire hit the site on 10 April 2026, SMAI claimed it was not the operator, while PhilEco maintained that it was forced out before finishing the mandated closure and rehabilitation.
PhilEco operated the NSLF under a concession agreement with the Navotas City government. As one of the last major sanitary landfills in the National Capital Region, it handled substantial volumes of Metro Manila’s solid waste in compliance with Republic Act 9003 (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act) and its Environmental Compliance Certificate.
PhilEco had a clean record managing NSLF’s operations for over 20 years, as the company had implemented strict controls to prevent gas buildup, spontaneous combustion, and other hazards common at poorly managed dumpsites. Operations continued until the concession expired in August 2025.
Even afterwards, PhilEco remained on site and had begun implementing the first phase of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-approved Safe Closure and Rehabilitation Plan (SCRP), steps both the SMAI and Navotas City were aware of.
In a statement to DAILY TRIBUNE, PhilEco said it repeatedly argued that with the possession lawfully transferred to SMAI, PhilEco could not legally and physically undertake engineering works on a property it no longer controlled.
Neither could PhilEco implement environmental safeguards over what had already been judicially delivered to another entity, it added.
The landfill operator held that regulatory accountability logically attached to the entity “which aggressively sought ownership, possession and control of the site with full knowledge of its environmental concerns.”
“Environmental compliance, monitoring, and reporting cannot be separated from operational authority,” it added.
PhilEco’s management demonstrated that, with proper oversight, a sanitary landfill could function safely without the catastrophic events now plaguing the site.
Forced takeover
In 2023, SMAI initiated expropriation proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Navotas to acquire the landfill site.
The SMC unit disclosed to the court that it intended to build a cloverleaf interchange as part of the road infrastructure supporting the New Manila International Airport (Bulacan Aerocity) project.
PhilEco contested the move, arguing that the site’s status as a Category 4 landfill made it unsuitable for such a development under DENR guidelines.
The company explicitly warned of environmental risks, including a fire hazard from disturbing compacted waste layers and trapped methane; leachate leakage that would contaminate Manila Bay; and structural instability and long-term ecological damage.
Despite these submissions, the court issued a Writ of Possession to SMAI. On 5 February 2026, a Notice to Vacate was served to PhilEco.
On 13 February 2026, a court sheriff enforced the order, removing PhilEco’s personnel and equipment, resulting in the erstwhile operator’s loss of all access and control of the property from that date onward.
PhilEco described the action as SMAI “driving out” its team — halting the completion of the SCRP and leaving the site vulnerable.
Catastrophe forewarned
The fire began in the evening of 10 April 2026. It burned intensely for over 20 hours before being declared “under control” on 12 April, but it continued to smolder with toxic emissions for days and weeks afterward. Satellite imagery showed 71.5 percent of the 40-hectare site had been affected.
The smoke caused hazardous air quality across Metro Manila, Bulacan, and beyond, prompting health advisories, evacuations, and the mobilization of DPWH equipment, Philippine Air Force helicopters, and other resources.
PhilEco immediately pointed out that when it operated the facility, not a single fire-related incident occurred.
The company said that in the post-takeover period, during which it had no access, conditions were allowed to develop that created the gas buildup and ignition risks it had predicted.
Initial investigation cited the hot weather and gas buildup as possible triggers for the fire. But the deeper issue, per PhilEco, lay in ignoring the expert warnings about building on an active or recently closed landfill.
At this time, the landfill is still smoldering, affecting the air quality in the surrounding communities.
The Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR has considered filing charges against PhilEco for lapses in the closure, but PhilEco countered that it lost control of the landfill on 13 February and was unable to finish its work.
Navotas officials noted that the legal disputes had delayed the safe closure. PhilEco maintained that it bore no responsibility post-takeover and urged an investigation into whether post-13 February activities (or inactions) contributed to the fire, especially given the company’s flawless 20-year record.
Serious questions remain. Should powerful conglomerates be allowed to expropriate critical environmental infrastructure for its ancillary project needs? Were warnings from the experienced operator adequately weighed against corporate timelines? What safeguards exist to prevent such handovers from creating exactly the disasters predicted?
(To be concluded)
