Strategically speaking, securing the safe passage of Filipino-flagged and manned oil tankers and commercial vessels through the troubled Strait of Hormuz boils down to political stability.

As it generally was for policymakers before the current crisis, rising fuel prices was essentially an economics problem, a matter of securing enough supplies to dampen the price at the pump.

But with the availability of fuel now clearly under threat, it is more a case of politics than economics. For that matter, it is about properly responding to an energy crisis brought about by geopolitics.

As far as this administration’s response to the oil supply crisis, the emerging consensus seems to be that it is “solid, quiet and effective.”

Here, the administration’s noticeable moves “are being done within the ambit of the alliance with Washington while taking advantage of some pre-existing goodwill,” pointed out political observer Manolo Quezon in an interesting note last week.

To bolster his point, Quezon said it only took weeks for the country to buy oil from Russia after diplomatic and energy officials secured a waiver from Washington.

Similarly, negotiating the safe passage of Philippine-bound and flagged tankers through Hormuz took “advantage of decades of good relations with Tehran and also the 30-day window of Iranian oil at sea announced by Washington.”

Paying critical attention to these geopolitical nuances, however, went largely unnoticed last week in the face of noisy “asides” regarding Iran’s concessions.

Noisy “asides” raised by, as one fellow journalist put it, “folks who care more about their (political) views validated than the veracity” of their outrageous claims.

Foremost among the “asides” was that the country should have had oil tankers of the Very Large Crude Capacity (VLCC) type to transport its oil from the Gulf Region.

Initially, there was some truth to the argument as the country only has small oil tankers, all which were exclusively transporting oil to different domestic destinations.

But the argument became moot in the face of the legal process called “bareboat chartering,” which allows Philippine companies to operate VLCCs they don’t own outright.

Issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the still valid Presidential Decrees 760 and 1711, which were crafted in response to earlier oil crises, “bareboat chartering” allows a ship owned by a foreign entity to fly the Philippine flag.

How it works, said a trade expert, is “a Philippine company, which must be at least 60-percent Filipino-owned, leases a ship from a foreign owner. The ship suspends its original flag — Saudi, UAE, whatever it was flying — and is issued a Temporary Certificate of Philippine Registry. The ship must be manned by a 100-percent Filipino crew.”

On paper and on the mast, therefore, the “bareboat chartered” ship is a Philippine ship and is entitled to the protection and an entry pass for designated corridors at Hormuz set by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRCC) which holds a firm grip on shipping through the strait.

Admittedly, there are concerns that Iran hasn’t actually given blanket immunity to Philippine ships, making the charter imperfect.

Though it is “not a perfect solution,” Energy Secretary Sharon Garin said it is a crucial step in reducing the risks and strengthening supply security and protection of Philippine-bound oil from the Gulf.

But the move would not immediately lower fuel prices, confessed Garin.

Nevertheless, all these and other future moves are meant to address and manage the graver fear that the country risks descending into political instability and chaos if nothing is done about the sky-high fuel prices and fuel supply problems.