The ongoing Senate inquiry into the hurried transfer of former President Rodrigo Duterte to the claws of the International Criminal Court (ICC) bared what most Filipinos had long suspected: that the non-cooperation by the government with the hypocritical tribunal was a public posture.

The Palace claimed the policy not to cooperate with the ICC on the war on drugs investigation was consistent.

Yet the arrest and transfer of Duterte on 11 March, which was all done within a day in a dramatic turn of events that resulted in the Philippine National Police apprehending the former chief executive under the guise of an Interpol order, revealed an operation that was at most a year in the making.

Nick Kaufman, Duterte’s lead counsel, said the denial of due process with the hasty ICC handover would be one of the points that will be brought up in seeking the dismissal of the crimes against humanity charge.

Evidence of ICC personnel entering the country in October 2024 was an early indication of government awareness and planning.

The details, raised during the Senate probe, paint a picture of selective cooperation.

The roles of Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and National Security Adviser Eduardo Año added to the mystery.

As Defense secretary, Teodoro oversees the Armed Forces of the Philippines, which was his stated reason for providing logistical support to the PNP during Duterte’s arrest at Ninoy Aquino International Airport and subsequent transfer to Villamor Air Base.

During the Senate proceedings, he maintained that this was a routine supporting role, saying, “The AFP’s mandate is to assist the PNP when requested, nothing more.”

Ano said his role was strictly limited to ensuring the situation “did not escalate into a national security concern.”

Both Cabinet officials claimed implementing the ICC warrant was beyond their jurisdiction.

The smooth execution raises questions about whether the government’s broader actions, including allowing ICC personnel into the country, were consistent with its non-cooperation position.

The administration asserted that it did not cooperate with the ICC, citing the 2019 withdrawal from the Rome Statute.

In the most recent Senate hearing, Senator Imee Marcos showed proof that four supposed ICC personnel — Glenn Roderick Thomas Kala, an investigator; Maya Destura Brackeen, an interpreter; and William Rosato and Amir John Kassam, both protection experts — entered the Philippines between 4 and 24 October 2024 based on Bureau of Immigration records.

The visits suggested the government either permitted or failed to prevent their entry, undermining its claim of non-cooperation.

A Department of Justice briefer also occurred in May 2024, outlining the “potential arrest of Duterte.” Senator Marcos quoted a briefing paper as acknowledging the policy against ICC entry but noting “the possibility of changes,” which signaled early awareness and planning.

The PNP’s 80-page directive, exposed by Marcos on 3 April 2025, detailed arrest scenarios, including asset seizures and targeting Duterte’s partner, Honeylet Avanceña.

PNP Chief, Police General Nicolas Torre III, confirmed the meticulous planning: “I told them to let me succeed or fail on my plans.”

The ICC personnel’s October visits were likely an opportunity to provide intelligence and coordination in preparation for the 11 March operation.

Actions that showed a softening of the non-cooperation resolve, with compliance linked to an obligation to Interpol after the visit of the ICC personnel, suggest a policy shift that the ICC then cited as providing a window for Duterte’s capture.

The AFP’s logistical role, securing Villamor Air Base, ensured no resistance to Duterte’s transfer.

While Teodoro denied direct involvement, his oversight enabled the operation’s success. It aligned with a broader government effort that started with tolerating the ICC personnel.

Marcos claimed that, in October 2024, the ICC visitors accessed documents that were later cited in the ICC arrest warrant, suggesting covert cooperation that contradicted the public denials.

According to a security analyst, the rapid timeline — arrest at 6:30 a.m., transfer by 11:03 p.m. — reflected a well-oiled process, not a spontaneous reaction.

If the October 2024 ICC visits were tied to the collection of evidence (as the Palace alleged), they would directly link to the warrant’s issuance, debunking the claim that the government consistently blocked the ICC’s efforts.

Far from demonstrating a consistent non-cooperation, the government’s actions — as revealed during the Senate investigation — selectively aligned with the objectives of the ICC and the demands of political expediency.