Ground rules for South China Sea (SCS) claimants were conceived in 1996, but until now, there is no certainty that they will ever be implemented due to Beijing’s maneuvers to stall an agreement that would limit its control over the region.

Instead of exercising leadership, the Asian giant had resorted to intimidation and deception to push its expansive ambitions in the region.

Beijing has branded as provocative the signing of the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, by President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. but such laws are necessary in the absence of the Code of Conduct (CoC) on the SCS.

The signing of the twin maritime laws is in accordance with international law, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling.

China built structures on the West Philippine Sea, which the country is now countering with laws that hopefully will dissuade the dominant power from further occupation.

While China recognizes UNCLOS, it considers the arbitral ruling as illegal and void, consistent with its position of not recognizing third-party involvement in territorial frictions.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been negotiating with China since 1996 when it suggested the CoC to bind all sea claimants.

In March 2002, CoC negotiations began and by November of that year, a Declaration of Conduct (DoC) of Parties in the South China Sea was signed but the document was meant to be an interim deal until the CoC took effect.

In the non-binding DoC, the parties pledged to settle differences peacefully and exercise self-restraint.

In September 2013, formal ASEAN-PRC consultations recommence on a CoC.

In 2017, the ASEAN and the PRC announced a “draft framework CoC” but in 2018, ASEAN and the PRC released another document called “Single Draft Negotiating Text.”

Then Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi vowed the CoC will be finalized within three years.

In 2021, instead of an agreement, the PRC unilaterally enacted a law allowing the use of force against perceived transgressors of Beijing’s claimed maritime sovereignty.

In 2023, ASEAN and the PRC agreed on new guidelines to accelerate negotiations.

They agreed on another three years, or until 2026, to complete the CoC.

A diplomat involved in some of the negotiations said the problems have remained the same over the years, Beijing is opposed to any agreement that will tie its hands.

For instance, most ASEAN members wanted a legally-binding CoC “but China is opposed.”

Beijing preferred to deal with the claimants in a bilateral manner where its economic and military leverage would count for more.

“The talks became deadlocked over whether the Southeast Asian nations would even be allowed to discuss the South China Sea collectively without Chinese representatives in the room,” the diplomat recalled.

Huong Le Thu, a senior analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said “China has used the prospect of a CoC as a Holy Grail to entice the region. The protracted process diverted their attention while Beijing advanced its strategic objectives.”

At best, the CoC issue is used as fodder for coexistence in that when the situation becomes tense, China considers the CoC.

It should not be the case, however, as China should respect the need to create rules in which it will be bound, a process in which it should exercise its leadership as a responsible global power.