Commendable is the tact our diplomatic and security officials have taken to calmly hold China to account over her maddening abuses last week at Ayungin Shoal and nearby Pag-asa Island, which injured Navy personnel and Filipino scientists.

Prudence, in the meantime, certainly makes the case in light of some recent developments in China, which we need to pay attentive heed to.

Responding tactfully, in fact, helps us see the true import of the verbal threats aired by Chinese Foreign Vice Minister Chen Xiaodong, who last week warned that our relations with China were at a crossroads and that we must act cautiously in deciding which path to follow.

On its own, Chen’s threats are serious. However, on close scrutiny, his threats speak more about China’s present foreign policy problems than ours.

This is strikingly evident when Chinese Premier Li Qiang admitted in a report made after China’s “Two Sessions” — the annual meeting of China’s rubber-stamp parliament — that during the last 12 months, “the external environment exerted a more adverse impact on China’s development.”

Li’s admission that China’s domestic problems were increasingly intertwined with foreign affairs is significant since, with China primarily focused on domestic issues caused by a persistent downturn of its economy, foreign affairs take a backseat.

Because of these issues, says analyst Nathaniel Sher, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi signaled that “Beijing will continue to shape an international environment conducive to China’s economic development.”

How China hopes to shape an “international environment” is seen by her present foreign policy priorities.

“China’s foreign policy priorities include hardening the economy against global disruptions, deepening ties with the developing world, stabilizing relations with the West, and playing a more active role in regional crises,” says Sher.

Of these priorities, China’s intent to develop deepening ties with the developing world is the most relevant to us.

Such a foreign policy priority, in fact, more than enough explains China’s manifest disgust over the video evidence provided by independent media outfits over the high-handed assaults by the China Coast Guard in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

These reports are increasingly vital in showing and convincing countries of the Global South that China’s physical warnings to us about what are and aren’t deemed acceptable to her have gotten out of bounds. India, for instance, last week openly condemned China’s aggressive tactics and promised help.

Meanwhile, significant developments in China’s military, particularly the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) rapid expansion of its Strategic Support Force (SSF), need our close attention.

The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reports that the SSF “is designed to expand the military’s space, cyber, electromagnetic, and psychological warfare capabilities and is tasked with offering intelligence for all forces while aiding in joint operations.”

As I understand it, China is bent on improving “asymmetrical” warfare capabilities by making the SSF the PLA’s center.

China, however, has yet to figure out how to make joint operations of the PLA’s various armed branches work.

So much so that China crucially needs relative peace at the moment to make the SSF fully functional and effective.

A fact that should put the lie to unfounded fears that China’s heightened WPS aggressions are a prelude to immediate hostilities. China isn’t ready for outright hostilities just yet.

Nonetheless, despite this crucial military development, it doesn’t mean the SSF has no sophisticated surveillance or cyberwar capabilities.

 “With its spy satellites, the PLA can know the situation in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. It could clearly monitor [the locations of] US aircraft carriers and its strike groups in the regions, which is the responsibility of the SSF,” an analyst told the SCMP.

In short, China need not go to great lengths to determine when and where our supply boats to Ayungin Shoal are deployed.

Formulating our correct strategy and tactics must smartly go beyond “engagements in visual range,” as is now the case with the WPS incidents.