Narrow path between power and principle

Narrow path between power and principle | Daily Tribune

The 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling remains the Philippines’ strongest legal anchor, affirming its rights within its exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS. Yet nearly a decade on, the ruling has not altered China’s posture on the ground. This enduring gap between legal entitlement and enforceability is the central constraint shaping all policy options.

On one hand, proposals to exclude China entirely, such as partnering with the United States or EU economies in contested areas, offer legal clarity and alignment with like-minded states. But they also carry high geopolitical risk. China is unlikely to acquiesce to exclusion in areas it claims, and such ventures could trigger sustained disruption, transforming commercial projects into flashpoints of great power rivalry.

The Philippines would then be forced to rely on external security assurances that may be uncertain in moments of crisis.

On the other hand, a purely unilateral approach is equally fraught. Without either accommodation or overwhelming enforcement capability, the Philippines may find itself unable to operationalize its own rights. The result is strategic paralysis –- sovereignty asserted, but not exercised.

This leaves a narrow but pragmatic middle path: a Philippines–China joint development framework or, failing that, a calibrated decision to defer contested development altogether while strengthening alternative energy sources. The objective is clear — avoid serious geopolitical confrontation while extracting tangible national benefit.

A joint venture, however, cannot be entered into lightly. It must be structured not as a concession, but as a controlled and conditional engagement. A 60/40 arrangement in favor of the Philippines, with Filipino leadership (CEO and chairmanship) and Chinese participation in technical operations, offers a starting point — but only if reinforced by strict safeguards.

Sovereignty must be insulated through a clear “without prejudice” clause. Cooperation must not be construed as recognition of competing claims. This preserves the Philippines’ legal position even as it engages in practical arrangements.

Governance must reflect real — not symbolic — control. Filipino leadership must exercise authority or veto power over strategic decisions such as production levels, financial flows, environmental standards and long-term planning.

While China may resist explicit subordination to Philippine jurisdiction, the framework should still reference Philippine law as the primary basis of operations, supplemented by mutually agreed protocols. Ambiguity here is dangerous; clarity is protective.

Dispute resolution must be internationalized. Neutral arbitration mechanisms and venues, such as those outlined by the rules of arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, reduce the risk that disagreements will be settled through coercion rather than law.

Transparency and accountability must be built into the financial structure. Independent audits and verifiable reporting ensure that a 60/40 split translates into real national benefit.

The agreement must be conditioned on cooperation and the absence of coercive actions at sea. If harassment or aggression occurs, the Philippines must retain the right to suspend operations without penalty. This introduces a behavioral incentive that has often been absent in prior engagements.

While both economies pursue this win-win scenario, the Philippines must simultaneously accelerate development in undisputed areas, invest in renewable energy, and deepen strategic ties with partners. These parallel efforts strengthen Manila’s leverage and ensure that engagement with China is a choice — not a dependency.

Yet it must also be said: if these safeguards cannot be secured, then the wiser course may be restraint. Entering a flawed agreement that erodes legal standing or invites coercion could be more damaging than foregoing development in the short term. In such a scenario, a “none for now” approach — paired with long-term capacity building — may better serve the national interest.

The unifying principle across all options is risk management. The West Philippine Sea dispute is not merely a legal contest; it is a test of strategic patience in an environment shaped by an asymmetry of power. The Philippines cannot resolve it unilaterally, nor can it afford to escalate it unnecessarily.

Thus, the end in view must be clear: maximize economic gain while minimizing geopolitical exposure. A well-structured Philippines–China joint venture, bound by firm safeguards, may achieve this balance.

In a dispute likely to outlast administrations and generations, success will not be measured by rhetorical victories or rigid postures. It will be measured by the Philippines’ ability to quietly secure its interests, preserve its rights, and avoid being drawn into a contest where the costs far outweigh the gains.