Stockholders caught in crossfire

A group of minority shareholders, seething in silence, has had enough of being collateral damage in a certain old-money clan’s very public civil war. Nosy Tarsee learned this from insiders of listed companies involved in the maelstrom.

If a family wishes to keep its feud within the family, it should not expose public investors to the noise, uncertainty, and governance strain that inevitably follow when personal conflict reaches the top of listed boards.

The group’s own listed vehicles have repeatedly stressed that, as publicly traded companies, they must avoid selective disclosure and ensure equal access to material information.

That is as it should be. But the present spectacle suggests a deeper mismatch between a private family mindset and public market obligations.

The overlap in leadership only sharpens the concern. Public records show the embattled family scion still chairs the main holding company, the flagship power generator, and the listed investment vehicle; serves as vice chair of the real estate arm; and sits on the board of the broadcasting arm, even as the courtroom battle over his attempted ouster from the family’s private flagship drags on.

When a family contest ricochets across multiple public boards, minority shareholders are entitled to ask whether governance structures are serving the companies or the combatants.

There is an obvious solution. If this clan wants full freedom to resolve control, capital allocation, and succession solely on family terms, it should take these companies private and buy out public shareholders at a fair premium.

That would mean an orderly tender offer, robust independent board processes, fairness opinions, and a price that reflects the surrender of liquidity and future upside. Anything less would merely privatize control while socializing the costs.

Public capital is not a family convenience. If money is to be raised from the market, then the market is owed stability, discipline, transparency, and a clear separation between private grievance and fiduciary duty.

These listed companies cannot ask investors to finance public enterprises while insisting that the consequences of family conflict are a private matter.