Courts usually frown upon the recantation of testimony by witnesses in criminal cases. Usually, courts do not allow a new trial merely because a witness backtracked on what he testified to.

In one case, the accused was charged with and convicted of carnapping, the theft of a motorcycle. The conviction resulted mainly from the testimony of one witness who positively identified the accused as taking the vehicle. The trial court ruled that, based on this testimony, there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused was meted a sentence of 14 to 17 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the trial court. Subsequently, the accused filed a motion for a new trial with the appellate court. Apparently, the witness who identified him recanted. The witness executed an affidavit, which the accused submitted to the court, declaring that he did not actually see the accused steal the vehicle. He further stated in the affidavit that he was merely persuaded by his uncle and aunt to testify against the accused.

The court refused to grant the plea. Undeterred, the accused elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. This is what the High Court had to say on the matter.

“For the retraction of a witness to constitute a ground for a new trial, it must be shown that: (1) the testimony of the retracting witness during trial is essential to the judgment of conviction such that its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion; (2) there exist special circumstances which, coupled with the retraction, raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by the retracting witness at the trial; and (3) there is no other evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction except said testimony.

“Rule 121, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides only two grounds for a new trial: (1) errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial; and (2) new and material evidence discovered which the accused could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial and which, if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment.

“Petitioner anchored his Motion for New Trial on the second ground, contending that [the witness’] new testimony to the effect that it was not petitioner whom he saw taking the motorcycle of [the owner], if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment of the lower court. Without a doubt, [the witness’] testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction since it was he who identified petitioner as the supposed offender. Without it, the prosecution would have had no leg to stand on, and the trial judge would have come to a different conclusion.

“While the private complainant testified that he owned the allegedly stolen motorcycle, his testimony was not indispensable to the petitioner’s conviction since he did not witness the taking and merely relied on the information [the witness] provided. Hence, there is no other evidence sustaining the judgment of conviction other than [the witness’] testimony.

“Finally, special circumstances exist which raise doubts as to the latter’s truth. The above circumstances, taken together with the fact that [the witness’] material testimony, if eliminated, would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, justify the grant of a new trial.

“Considering the gravity of the penalty for carnapping, granting a new trial would better serve the ends of justice since it is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence.

“Under Rule VI, Section 3(c) of the 2009 Internal Rules of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in appeals in criminal cases where a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12 of the Rules of Court.

“Hence, we deem it necessary to remand the case to the CA for proper disposition.”

Here, while the accused is not yet off the hook, he now has a better chance of fighting for and proving his innocence.

The facts and redacted portion of the decision are from SC G.R. 259589 (29 July 2025). Names of parties are likewise redacted.