Minus the towering personalities, minus their blinding competencies, minus their high positions in government, the whole debate gravitates around whether what is argued — for or against — is about land or about water.

Not only is there a knowledge deficit and a difficulty in understanding, there now emerges a serious language barrier on both sides, largely because of the strange absence in the dialectical menu of, first, a definition of terms and, second, clarity with regard to the focal question sought to be resolved.

Thus, while many more intermediaries, even supernumeraries, joined the fray, what China, as well as other countries concerned, is watching is a political circus largely reflective of what a foreign author described as our “damaged psyche.”

Seen on the global stage, our leaders have only proven themselves to be less than good actors or performers. In other words, we fall short on nearly all fronts, be it national security, diplomacy, bilateral or multilateral accord, joint collaboration, or modus vivendi.

Perhaps some themes and subthemes need to be rolled down. In such a diagnostic test, one can start to check the boxes on whether he or she understands this or that. Let’s run down specifics that already rise to the surface of this disturbing national conversation, lest more public figures than necessary fall into the cracks created by the clash of intellectual or academic preeminence.

First, are we really talking in terms of truth or falsehood on whether or not there is a South China Sea, much less a West Philippine Sea, in their factual, historical and existential ontologies?

Second, do we embrace that the Kalayaan Island Group lies within our exclusive economic zone or actually far beyond it? Third, do we as much as equivocate a clear and proud sense of nationalism, nay patriotism, if one advocates for the preservation of the KIG as within the EEZ and the larger WPS than one who advocates otherwise (i.e., to momentarily approach the fight from its best possible perspective)?

When China effectively took control of Scarborough Shoal consequent to a two-month standoff between the Chinese Coast Guard and its militia and the Philippines’ counterpart contingent, it was of our own making after committing what may well be regarded as a faux pas.

Could the Philippine Navy have resorted to it in a misplaced bravado on matters of maritime dispute at the time without violating the rules-based order or international law?

For another, did all the neighboring countries commend our earlier resolve to ground a seaworthy navy ship at Ayungin Shoal for the romanticized notion of symbolizing Philippine sovereignty in those maritime waters?

Was the then president, more so the defense and navy organization, in its right senses to transform a grounded ship into an outpost as if to drive away Chinese vessels, fishing boats and poachers? What international award, nay recognition, if any, has the country gained in having done so? Has such a probably meaningless posture become the “gold standard,” in a manner of speaking?

A quick glance at history magnifies the stark reality that there’s no indisputable proof of our professed sense of nationalism, which is nothing but a myth, a self-fulfilling prophecy, an impossible dream. Historical instances worth problematizing beg rational answers.

When Vietnamese forces took control of Southwest Cay (i.e., Pugad) in the Spratly Islands from the Philippines, what has the government done to prevent it to this day? Further to that, how about Pearson Reef, Sandy Cay and Namyit Island, all overlapping with Philippine claims?

With minds confused as ever, how are we doing with the Sabah claim now under a “state of suspended animation?” Whatever happened to Malaysia’s submission to the UN regarding its continental shelf, noting that it covered areas within the Kalayaan Island Group?

Strangely, a 1962 commission even found that a majority of Sabahans favored joining Malaysia. In 2024, Malaysia raised a protest over our encroachment of Sabah’s maritime areas. Faire capot, what gives?