Employing the Unprogrammed Appropriations (UA) as a mechanism to resurrect the pork barrel system on a larger scale than the unconstitutional Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) requires a conspiracy between the Executive and Legislative branches.

The UA, created to give the government flexibility in budget use, was perverted from the start of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s term, indicating a premeditated plan.

According to former budget secretary Florencio Abad, the manipulation of the UA was undertaken by the Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicam), “in collusion with high executive officials.”

The way it was done over the years was through transferring de-funded priority projects in the General Appropriation Bill to the UAs during Bicam meetings.

Inserted into the budget were pork and patronage projects, which receive guaranteed funding.

The syndicate within government repurposed the UA to feed its appetite for pork, inflating it to unprecedented levels.

In the realm of public finance, “control of the budget is control of policy,” the fiscal executive said.

Abad headed the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) throughout the late President Noynoy Aquino’s term, which means he knows what he is talking about.

The Constitution vested the power of appropriation exclusively in Congress, which Abad said is not a procedural technicality but the legislature’s primary check on executive power.

“It is the foundation of fiscal accountability in a presidential system,” he added.

The abuse of the UA, however, changed the constitutional design.

In 2016, UA had an allocation of P67.5 billion, but in 2023, this ballooned to P807.2 billion, then to P724.4 billion in 2024, and P363.2 billion in 2025.

Abad explained that an appropriation is not simply permission to spend; under the Constitution, it requires Congress to decide which specific public purposes will be funded and how much will be spent.

“These decisions reflect prioritization and trade-offs that belong exclusively to the Legislature. The Executive’s role begins only after these parameters are set, in the implementation of the budget,” he added.

Deploying the UA led to a two-stage budget process, one approved by Congress with unresolved allocations, and another completed by the Executive during budget execution, which Abad equated to compromising transparency, predictability, and the credibility of the fiscal plan.

Budget discipline is diluted since the Constitution already provides a step for new or additional spending needs, through a supplemental appropriation law, which requires renewed legislative approval and public justification.

Through the UA, the Executive assumes appropriations power, deciding the allocations of supposedly contingent funds for projects in the UA.

This was done in 2024 by inserting a provision into the national budget law that allowed the Department of Finance (DoF) to sweep “excess funds” from government-owned and controlled corporations to bankroll projects in the UA.

“An appropriation that leaves the final choice of purpose and amount to post-enactment discretion is, constitutionally and fiscally, no appropriation at all,” according to Abad.

During deliberations on the 2026 budget, leaders of both chambers pledged to end the irregularity, a vow best taken with a grain of salt, given the UA’s continued presence.

It would take the Supreme Court to stop opportunistic officials from dipping their sinister hands into the yearly budget.