Diplomatic protests over WPS incidents

Diplomatic protests over WPS incidents | Daily Tribune

The recent incident involving the China Coast Guard firing water cannons at Filipino fishing boats, resulting in injuries to three fishermen, underscores the persistent and escalating tension in the West Philippine Sea.

The Philippines is preparing to file yet another diplomatic protest, but the skepticism about the effectiveness of these protests is palpable.

The reality is that despite formal complaints and international legal rulings, China continues to assert its claim over the waters, challenging the sovereignty of the Philippines and the rule of law.

The West Philippine Sea, part of the larger South China Sea (SCS) which China claims sovereign rights over, is not just a body of water. It is a lifeline for many Filipino fishers and is rich in vital resources such as oil, gas, and marine biodiversity.

Escoda Shoal, where the recent water cannon incident occurred, lies well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles from its coast. These waters are rich in marine life and are crucial to the livelihood of the local communities.

Despite the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration invalidating China’s extensive claim based on its nine-dash line, the Philippines continues to face unrestrained aggression from Chinese vessels.

The aggressive tactics used against Filipino fishermen, including water cannons and boat ramming, reflect a concerted effort by China to assert control over these resources, disregarding legal determinations and bilateral agreements.

The Philippines’ filing of diplomatic protests against the aggressor, China, is an essential step in asserting its rights and reaffirming its commitment to international law.

Sadly, the effectiveness of these protests has been called into question.

Previous protests — 47 this year alone, including the latest one filed by the Department of Foreign Affairs on 9 December, for a total of 245 since 2022 — have yielded little more than formal responses, with no tangible outcomes or changes in China’s behavior.

Critics argue that repeated diplomatic protests, while necessary, are nothing but empty gestures in the face of the ongoing violations.

The Philippine dilemma is painfully clear: while the country seeks to uphold its sovereignty through peaceful means, the aggressive and often unlawful actions of the much more superior Chinese vessels is a stark reminder of the limits of diplomacy in addressing the conflict.

Incursions by Chinese maritime forces continue unabated and this raises serious concerns about whether diplomatic engagements alone can lead to a resolution.

What the government can do is to pursue a multifaceted approach, including boosting investments in Philippine naval and coast guard resources.

It should also expend efforts to strengthen the country’s strategic partnerships with ASEAN nations and allies like Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the US, among others, to create a unified front against China’s aggression in the SCS.

The Philippine government, through the DFA, has been part of the hammering out of an ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in the SCS since 2018, with renewed efforts and goals set for conclusion by July 2026. This will be crucial to the Philippines, and a particular concern for President Marcos Jr. since the country will, by then, have assumed the chairmanship of ASEAN.

It’s difficult work — finalizing a substantive CoC by 2026 — and whether it can be concluded by then remains uncertain. In essence, the CoC aims to codify peaceful interaction and dispute resolution in the contested waters of the SCS, and to move beyond the adoption of general principles to specific enforceable rules.

The big question is, will China agree to a CoC which would curtail its behavior and blunt its interests in the SCS? Will it curb its encroachment into waters which it stubbornly insists belong to it?