Supreme Court junks Sen. Ejercito petition in connection with PDAF scam

The Supreme Court (SC) En Banc, in a decision penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, dismissed the petitions filed by Senator Jose “Jinggoy” P. Ejercito Estrada in connection with the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) cases.

In the SC briefer issued 29 October, the Court dismissed Estrada’s petitions for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 236268, 249919, and 254892 involving plunder cases for being moot and academic.

The Court took judicial notice of the Sandiganbayan decision dated 19 January 2024, which acquitted Estrada of the plunder charges, rendering the petitions moot and academic. The Court also dismissed Estrada’s petitions for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 228374-84, the graft cases, rejecting his contention that graft charges under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 are “deemed absorbed” by his plunder charges under Republic Act No. 7080 (Anti-Plunder Law).

During its en banc session on 28 October, the SC acted on the following cases: G.R. Nos. 228374-84, Estrada v. Hon. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 236268, People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan and Estrada; G.R. No. 249296, Napoles v. Hon. Rafael R. Lagos et al.; G.R. No. 249919, Estrada v. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan; and G.R. Nos. 254892 and 254906-15, Estrada v. Hon. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines.

The Ombudsman had initially found probable cause to indict Estrada and Janet Lim Napoles, along with several other officials and private individuals, before the Sandiganbayan for: (a) plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, relating to Estrada’s alleged ill-gotten wealth of at least P183.79 million in kickbacks from Napoles in connection with the PDAF scam; and (b) 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, involving fund releases amounting to an estimated P255.11 million drawn from Estrada’s PDAF and coursed through different foundations, as reflected in disbursement vouchers.

The Court clarified that the act of “giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference” under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 cannot be absorbed by the criminal acts under Section 1(d)(2) and (6) of RA 7080, emphasizing that the two offenses punish distinct wrongs:

Under RA 3019, the benefit or advantage is given to a private individual separate from the public officer;

Under RA 7080, the public officer directly benefits by receiving kickbacks or unjustly enriching himself through a combination or series of overt acts.

The only exception is when the information alleging a violation of RA 3019 names the same public officer, acting in a private capacity, as the beneficiary of the unwarranted benefit, since the primary beneficiary of both plunder and graft would then be the same person.

The Court further explained that the absorption principle—where one offense merges into another—does not apply between graft and plunder, except in rare cases where the same public officer is both the giver and recipient of the unwarranted benefit.

The decision affirms that violations of RA 3019 may be prosecuted separately from plunder.