A marathon runner, who is a minor, died after he was bumped by a jeepney traversing a road which is part of the marathon route. When the minor’s parents filed a case for damages against the marathon sponsor and organizer, both denied liability. The sponsor claimed that its participation is limited to providing financial assistance.

On the other hand, the organizer argued that the minor’s death was due to an accident exclusively caused by the negligence of the jeepney driver who was racing against a bus, and the doctrine of assumption of risk absolves the organizer from liability after the minor, with his parents’ permission, signed a waiver of all causes of action arising from his participation in the marathon.

Who should now be considered as the proximate cause of the marathon runner’s death? This was the issue resolved by the Supreme Court in Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company and Intergames Inc. (G.R. 164749, 15 March 2017).

The trial court held that the marathon sponsor and organizer are solidarily liable. However, this was reversed by the Court of Appeals which concluded that the proximate cause of the minor’s death is the jeepney driver’s negligence, and the waiver executed by the minor may be invoked against his parents since it includes vehicular accidents.

The Supreme Court did not fully agree with the lower courts. Applying principles on quasi-delict, it held that the proximate cause of the minor’s death is the negligence of the organizer. The Supreme Court also absolved the marathon sponsor from liability and did not apply the doctrine of assumption of risk to bar the parents’ claim for damages.

The organizer failed to ensure the safety of the inexperienced participants from the foreseeable vehicular accident within the marathon route. It is negligent in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from vehicular traffic despite having that option, and in relying only on the volunteers who were not properly instructed on their tasks.

The Supreme Court added that the jeepney driver’s negligence, albeit an intervening cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection between the organizer’s negligence and the injury suffered by the runner.

Anent the sponsor, it is not liable since its participation is limited to financing the race and it did not involve itself in the preparations for the actual conduct of the race.

As to the runner’s waiver, the Supreme Court ruled that it is not an effective form of express or implied consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk (one who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom).

To quote the Supreme Court, “nobody in his right mind would have joined the marathon if he had known of or appreciated the risk of harm or even death from vehicular accident while running in the organized running event. Without question, a marathon route safe and free from foreseeable risks was the reasonable expectation of every runner participating in an organized running event.”

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