Some may call it yet another example of flip-flopping by the Supreme Court, but for others, it should highlight the readiness of the highest court of the land to revisit its own decisions and to correct them as needed.

In a landmark ruling poised to reshape the landscape of cyber libel in the Philippines, the SC has declared that the offense should only have a one-year prescription period versus the previous 15 years.

In the ruling promulgated on 11 October 2023 but published only this week, the SC departed from the previous 15-year prescription period for cyber libel as laid down under the so-called Tolentino Doctrine.

This is not a small victory for journalists, whose outputs, whether print or broadcast, invariably are uploaded onto the Internet, thus making them fair game for cyber libel charges, even those that have no basis, are whimsical, or are intended to harass or silence them.

The irony is that this SC decision was reached thanks to a petition filed by a disbarred lawyer and former journalist, Berteni Causing. While the ruling did not favor Causing personally, it nonetheless extracted a legal pearl from the murky waters of cyberspace.

This decision is not merely a legal nuance, but a crucial step towards ensuring justice is served promptly in the ever-evolving realm of online defamation.

To recall, Causing challenged the dismissal of his motion to quash cyber libel charges filed against him by former South Cotabato Representative Ferdinand Hernandez. The alleged cyber libel stemmed from Causing’s Facebook posts in 2019, accusing Hernandez of misappropriating funds intended for victims of the 2017 Marawi City siege.

While the Supreme Court denied Causing’s motion to quash, it agreed with his argument that cyber libel is not a new crime but a mere digital iteration of the age-old offense of libel under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Court’s revisiting of the Tolentino Doctrine threw out its 15-year-old prescriptive period for cyber libel under Republic Act 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, maintaining that the offense should be defined and penalized under Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC.

This distinction is vital, emphasizing that cyber libel is not an entirely new crime but a manifestation of the classic offense that was merely adapted to the digital age. In short, the SC rightfully declared cyberspace as just another platform, just like traditional print or broadcast.

In underscoring the need for an understanding of cyber libel, the SC rejected the notion that it deserves a lengthier prescriptive period solely due to its digital nature. By aligning cyber libel with traditional libel laws, which are prescribed within one year, the Court has not only simplified legal procedures but also acknowledged the continuity of the offense across different mediums.

Furthermore, the ruling highlights the importance of when the prescriptive period begins — from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, authorities, or their agents. This practical approach recognizes the challenges of prosecuting cyber libel cases, given the nature of online communication and the need for a reasonable timeframe for legal actions.

The implications of this decision are far-reaching, with Causing himself noting its broader impact, describing it as a victory, if we may add, not only for himself but for all journalists and those who take to social media to practice their freedom of speech.

While the freedom of speech and the press is not absolute as no freedom is, the SC decision should be taken in the broader context of preserving those freedoms and ensuring a fair legal framework in the digital age.

The one-year prescription period strikes a balance between holding individuals accountable for their online actions and preventing the misuse of protracted legal proceedings to stifle free speech.

In aligning cyber libel with traditional libel laws, the Court has demonstrated a commitment to upholding justice while safeguarding fundamental rights in the evolving landscape of online communication.

As we navigate the complexities of the cyber age, the Supreme Court’s wisdom in this matter will undoubtedly serve as a guiding precedent for future cases, ensuring a fair and expedient administration of justice in the digital realm.

Insofar as the SC admitted as much that it adopted Causing’s reading of the law that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 did not create any new crime, but merely recognized cyberspace as a new communication platform, we might as well give the disbarred lawyer the credit he deserves by calling this ruling, the Causing Doctrine.