Dealing with China (1)

When China refused to honor the Hague decision that most of the West Philippine Sea was part of Philippine territory, it was virtually an "act of war" against the whole world in a geopolitical sense because it implied the defiance of an international law that was enacted by the international community, of which China is a part.

When ex-President Duterte played footsies with China, supporting this "act of war," China's false territorial claims were strengthened. The Hague decision had no more teeth. China now had the gall to employ brinkmanship in the WPS, such as the jamming of US carrier warplanes. Duterte's move made China braver in defying the US.

Enter PBBM. When PBBM chose a US alliance with the expansion of the  Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement military bases, China lost a valuable geopolitical card. Its dream of the Philippines being forever under its thumb because it could manipulate any Philippine president, like Duterte, suddenly became an illusion. PBBM's move was a 180-degree turn, a total game-changer.

These new developments are inputs for a strategy for dealing with China. The US promise of a naval upgrade of our Navy and Coast Guard is still unfulfilled. We need ASAP lasers and water cannons on our Coast Guard ships, which must be upgraded. Japan has moved faster, giving us sophisticated surveillance equipment.

The recent "swarming" by Chinese ships in the WPS and its intensifying food blockades make us wonder what they are up to in these areas. Are there secret oil discoveries or secret military expansions of missiles and electronic jammers? Are they, in fact, getting ready for a major confrontation with the US? The US should update us regularly with its intelligence data.

Air supremacy is the name of the game in the WPS. The US has released "180 photos and videos of Chinese intercepts of US fighter jets" in the West Pacific in the last two years (Aljazeera, 18 Oct. 2023), raising the alarm to a sudden escalation when push comes to shove.

"The US and Chinese air forces are stepping up their training to prepare for a potential showdown." The US Air Force worries about "the growing size and capability of China's aviation force." In truth, the Pentagon fears that the US "edge," whatever is left of it, if it still exists, is slowly eroded by China's fast-paced moves in the Pacific. China's "more realistic training has helped China close the gap."

Finally, China's air force under Xi has shifted recently from "scripted exercises, seeking more realism and more opportunities for its pilots to learn from failure." In reply, the US Air Force has formulated more complex scenarios in its war games with allies. (Business Insider, 21 Dec. 2023).

What do we do if the present "low-intensity" US-China confrontation in the WPS suddenly escalates into a full-blown superpower duel? We must have proactive plans for this eventuality. Will we regret our alliance with the US due to the collateral damage in the EDCA base areas? Would it not have been better to have stayed neutral? Or is neutrality next to impossible in today's proxy-war environment?

How and how far we can defy China without triggering a US-China confrontation — in which we will bear the brunt of collateral damage — is a tight-rope walk. Could we trigger that confrontation if we achieve the naval upgrades the US promised?

We cannot, however, stand idle against China's intensifying food blockades, ramming of our ships, and laser and water cannon harassment. The more we back down, the more China employs brinkmanship. That is the dilemma in dealing with China.

Any strategy in dealing with China is full of uncertainty, risks, and dilemmas. Any plan is also subject to sudden changes as new situations evolve.  But within these touch-and-go situations, a pro-active overall strategy can still be formulated, which may include: (1) a WPS task force meeting regularly; (2) a DND-DFA program on the procurement of weapons, such as an upgrade of naval capability; (3) DND-DFA-assisted regular Philippine-initiated war games with allies, particularly Japan, Australia, the US, and Vietnam; (4) emphasis on rapid deployment capability; (5) DFA enhancement of diplomatic ties with allies to assist on any above programs or strategies; (6) a program on surveillance with quick access to media; and (7) match Chinese oil explorations with our own in partnership with US and Russia.

The tendency is to be lethargic until a big event happens. So we must be proactive and have a "WPS czar" as a leader.            To be continued

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