A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked to contract a second marriage
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked to contract a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. In Domingo v Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v Mendoza, People v Aragon, and Odayat v Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage.
In Mendoza (1954), the appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941 and 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the second wife's death. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance and, hence, nonexistent without a judicial decree declaring it so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat (1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an 'inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family"; as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life."
So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage to contract another cannot be accomplished merely based on the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more.
Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to mockery and rest on very shaky foundations. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
What, then, is the important reckoning date? 3 August 1988. If the marriage was before then, no judicial declaration is needed. If after, then one is necessary. Now you know.
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution declared by the Constitution as an 'inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family'; as such, the State shall protect it.
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