Not a ground for termination

A was employed as a driver for a rent-a-car corporation. He shuttled passengers to and from the airport. He had an unblemished record for seven years. One evening in February 2015, he went back to the office after his shift. After getting his belongings, he encountered another employee on the office premises who allegedly was staring at him sharply. He accosted said employee and asked what his problem was. The latter fired back asking him the same question. A heated argument ensued with pushing and shoving each other. Another employee and a security guard intervened to break up the scuffle to avoid further harm and violence. Because of this, A, after an administrative hearing, was terminated on the ground of serious misconduct.

Having lost his bread and butter, A of course did not take this lightly. He hailed the car rental company into the National Labor Relations Commission. His ground was illegal termination. After the filing of the position papers, the labor arbiter of the NLRC opined that A was validly terminated as he indeed committed serious misconduct by causing a scuffle in the office premises.

This finding was affirmed by the Commission, on appeal. This prompted A to go up to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court did not favor the reasoning of the NLRC. It contended that there was indeed illegal dismissal. This is so because the skirmish that involved A was not grave enough to fall under serious misconduct. The said court, in fact, upon looking into the evidence found that only pushing and shoving were involved. There was no strangling as alleged by the corporation. The court thus reversed the NLRC and ordered the reinstatement of A, plus all the monetary entitlement accorded by the labor laws.

It was the corporation's turn to bring the matter up to the Highest Court. It maintained its position that A was validly terminated for serious misconduct. After weighing all the evidence, the Supreme Court sided with A.

"Based on our judicious review of the records, we agree with the appellate court that there is no serious misconduct to warrant the dismissal of Medina from employment. Misconduct is generally defined as 'a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.' Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee on the ground of serious misconduct committed in connection with or relative to the performance of his duties. Here, none of the requisites for a serious misconduct is present. To reiterate, the CA found that only a petty quarrel involving shoving or slight pushing transpired between Medina and Pogoy. The same was 'nipped in the bud by the intervention of the security guards on duty and Viggayan. It did not cause work stoppage nor posed a threat to the safety of the other employees. (G&S) did not show how (Medina's) misconduct has adversely affected its business, or how (Medina) has become unfit to continue working for the company.' Thus, there was no just cause for the termination of Medina's employment with G&S."

"The testimony of the security guard on duty stated that he saw Medina boxing and strangling Pogoy on the night of February 12, 2015. To counter G&S's argument, Viggayan's testimony revealed that he saw Medina and Pogoy pushing or shoving each other, not boxing or strangling. The statement that there was no boxing or strangling is consistent with Medina's statements during the administrative hearing. By appreciating the respective testimonies of the security guard on duty and Viggayan, as well as the transcript of the administrative hearing, the CA was able to arrive at a just decision in the case and correctly concluded that 'what transpired between (Medina) and Pogoy was a petty quarrel that merely involved shoving or slight pushing. The incident did not cause bodily harm, except a minor scratch in (Medina's)knee, nor did it in any manner interfere with fellow employees or the operations of the business.' This finding of fact by the appellate court is crucial in determining whether Medina was illegally dismissed."