Political ‘theater of the absurd’
Our bureaucrats generally tend to cross boundaries in terms of function, the scope of authority, and institutional mandate.
When feisty politicians grandstand, it strikes a populist cord that instantly acquires adherence to their worldview and they encapsulate this into a fairly acceptable policy agenda. Likewise, when bureaucrats perform their jobs ahead of themselves, things tend to spiral out of control and their overreaching roles transcend established parameters.
Let's roll out instances when this inter-locking assumption is in play, to wit:
When 31 million chose BBM over its arch-rival in the May polls, people did so on a strong belief that he would make the better leader who will advance the public interest, above all else. It follows that in turn, now President BBM is expected to choose the cream of the crop to head core departments, crucial commissions, critical agencies, and bureaus in a bloated bureaucracy.
Are their appointments based along disciplinary lines since political patronage would prove a poor barometer if one has set solid benchmarks of performance? It's discomforting to learn that one already appointed NTC chief would head the CoA instead; along with a prized 7-year term. It's hard to imagine that "bureaucratic interoperability" is at work here (i.e. expertise in telecommunications and the auditing field) because it would be like playing two odd musical instruments at the same time or akin to comparing apples with oranges.
Bureaucrats at the level of line department secretaries just cannot be left to their own devices sans wisdom from above. To do so results in many discordant voices — a dissonance that disrupts the smooth delivery of goods and services — on what the government does or does not do. Our bureaucrats generally tend to cross boundaries in terms of function, the scope of authority, and institutional mandate.
For instance, for a senator to act as a politician at the same time as a bureaucrat tends to inherently bring about a degree of confusion in desired governance outcomes. This makes us ask whether elective office takes higher precedence than a merely appointive one.
The case of an elected congressman appointed to become the justice secretary is certainly cut from the same cloth. Now caught in the storm of unexpected political events, it begs reflection on whether he would have made the better choice, since, if mounting pressures might soon cause his resignation, the good secretary has no position to fall back on. The trade-off proved cruel.
