After a series of clarificatory hearings, the House Committee on Justice — amid a victory dance — voted unanimously on there being probable cause to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte thereby advancing the complaint to the full chamber.
Crucial to the proceedings was the dramatic presentation of Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) data revealing hundreds of suspicious bank transactions involving VP Duterte and her husband, lawyer Mans Carpio, totaling billions of pesos, figures that were at odds with her declared Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) that showed little to no cash or deposits in key years.
Yet even as the panel members trumpeted these disclosures as evidence of unexplained wealth and betrayal of public trust, a larger legal question lingers: Did the House overreach in how it obtained and then aired this information?
Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Adolfo Azcuna, a respected voice on constitutional procedure, draws a firm line rooted in statute.
In a recent interview, Azcuna argued that while the House may gather documents like SALNs and summon witnesses in its preliminary role of determining probable cause, it remains bound by restrictive laws, chief among them the Bank Secrecy Law or Republic Act 1405.
Banks, he noted, can lawfully refuse a House committee’s demand to open specific accounts, as the statutory exception for “cases of impeachment” does not clearly extend to the chamber’s investigative phase.
That power, Azcuna contended, belongs more properly to the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.
He cited the 2000-2001 impeachment of former President Joseph Estrada as precedent. There, the Senate, acting as an impeachment court, compelled testimony on the infamous “Jose Velarde” account, complete with a bank representative on the stand.
The House’s posture bordered on turning a gatekeeping function into a quasi-trial, Azcuna warned, raising the specter of a “fishing expedition” where the complainants unload evidence they fear might not survive Senate scrutiny.
“Where should they draw the line?” he asked pointedly. “When might it cross into what should be the Senate’s role?” The limit, he insisted, was the law itself.
Impeachment is deliberately delineated. The House is the accuser and determinant of probable cause, while the Senate serves as judge and jury. Blurring those roles risks procedural abuse and undermines due process.
The House majority’s assertion that the entire impeachment complaint was an exception to the bank secrecy provision, thereby allowing AMLC data dumps in open session, stretches the statute’s text and invites a legal challenge. VP Duterte’s camp has filed complaints alleging violations of secrecy laws hand further court petitions seem inevitable.
Azcuna’s caution is directed to the House, which has every right and duty to investigate serious allegations against a high official.
But it does not have a license to disregard statutory safeguards simply because the political stakes are high or because “accountability” reverberates in a press release.
Probable cause demands credible evidence. Compelling or effectively publicizing protected bank records at the House stage risks tainting the process and handing the defense a procedural lifeline.
The Estrada precedent remains instructive — as real transparency and decisive evidence emerged in the Senate phase, under rules that respected both secrecy laws and the gravity of removal from office.
If the House truly believes its case against Vice President Duterte is strong, it should trust the constitutional design and leave the full airing and the subpoena power that most cleanly pierces bank secrecy to the Senate, where it belongs.
Anything less invites the charge that the clarificatory hearing was less about justice than spectacle.