A cache of internal documents from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) has revealed how infrastructure funds running into the billions of pesos are calculated, redistributed, and in some cases deliberately reduced across regions and legislative districts, using a formula that blends data-driven computation with policy discretion.
The documents, disclosed by Batangas Rep. Leandro Legarda Leviste on 24 December, were provided to him by former DPWH undersecretary Maria Catalina Cabral following a 11 June meeting in her office. Leviste said he later sent a formal follow-up letter dated 11 August to DPWH Secretary Manuel Bonoan requesting the detailed National Expenditure Program (NEP) computations and per-district budget breakdowns.
According to Leviste, the files were used by Cabral to explain what DPWH calls its “High-Level Budget Allocation Formula” and the “Baselined-Balanced-Managed” or BBM parametric formula adopted during the preparation of the 2023 NEP. Copies of some of the documents were later shared with the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and cited in its reporting.
The formula begins with what DPWH describes as a safeguard against inequity: a guaranteed minimum allocation for each region and legislative district. This minimum is determined using a “minimax” approach, where the highest value among three baselines becomes the floor for funding. These baselines are derived from historical lowest DPWH allocations, minimum infrastructure spending per capita pegged at P3,100 per person annually, and minimum infrastructure density set at roughly P641,700 to P642,000 per square kilometer per year.
On paper, the system ensures that no district or region falls below a computed threshold. In practice, however, the documents show that this is only the starting point.
Once the baseline is established, the formula proceeds to its “Balanced” and “Managed” stages, where allocations are adjusted upward or downward depending on poverty incidence, infrastructure density, absorptive capacity, disaster vulnerability, and even the presence of public-private partnership projects. Regions with higher-than-average poverty levels receive additional infrastructure “premiums,” while those deemed to have low infrastructure density are granted redistribution adjustments meant to close development gaps.
But the same formula also authorizes explicit deductions.
Charts and tables in the documents show that regions with historically high infrastructure density – most notably the National Capital Region and Region IV-A (Calabarzon) – are subject to budget reductions of up to three percent of the total allocation ceiling. The justification cited is that these areas already benefit from heavy past infrastructure spending and a high concentration of PPP-funded projects, allowing DPWH to redirect resources elsewhere.
In effect, growth hubs are penalized for having grown too much, while lagging regions are boosted through data-calibrated redistribution.
Beyond geography and poverty, the formula introduces a performance-based layer that rewards districts with strong absorptive capacity and high disbursement rates. Districts that rank among the top performers may receive additional allocations amounting to as much as five percent of their legislative district budget, split between historical and current performance. Further premiums are allocated to districts in the 20 poorest provinces, climate-vulnerable areas identified by DPWH, and regions requiring disaster-resiliency investments.
The documents make clear that the allocation system is not merely technical but inherently political.
The final “Managed” component explicitly allows adjustments based on national priorities and presidential directives, acknowledging that infrastructure budgeting is simultaneously an economic, legal, and political exercise. One section notes that higher-level considerations beyond engineering and economic metrics may influence final allocations, effectively reserving space for executive intervention even after the formula has produced its results.
For lawmakers, this raises a critical issue.
While DPWH maintains that the BBM formula promotes objectivity and transparency, Leviste’s request underscores a key concern: the formula alone is not enough without full disclosure of how it is applied to each district. Without access to the actual NEP computations, legislators are asked to debate and approve massive infrastructure budgets without seeing precisely who gains, who loses, and how much discretion is exercised after the numbers are run.
In a Congress where infrastructure appropriations can determine political fortunes and regional development for years, the absence or delayed release of district-level breakdowns invites suspicion that formulas can be cited when convenient and obscured when uncomfortable.
The documents now circulating show that DPWH’s allocation process is far from arbitrary. But they also confirm that redistribution, deductions, and rewards are embedded in the math itself – and that final outcomes remain subject to policy judgment at the highest levels.
As Congress resumes scrutiny of the national budget, the issue is no longer whether a formula exists. The issue is whether lawmakers and the public are being given full visibility into how that formula is applied, adjusted, and ultimately approved.
Because while the numbers may appear neutral, the power they distribute is anything but.