The fragile condition of Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Juan Ponce Enrile recalls the harsh treatment he endured in the country’s history — often at the hands of those who failed to grasp the complexity of his character, which was shaped by a deep understanding of the social and political realities he helped define.
Enrile was one of the guests during the early editions of the DAILY TRIBUNE’s program Straight Talk, where he discussed the role of the leading characters in the 1986 People Power revolt.
He was prepared to put on the line everything, including his life, on 22 February 1986 when he and the late President Fidel Ramos, then the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Vice Chief of Staff, withdrew support from President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. following a failed coup attempt at Malacañang by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) that was discovered.
He recounted how the revolt came to be labeled the EDSA uprising. RAM, or the group of soldiers who joined the breakaway from the Marcos regime, suggested engaging the AFP in a guerrilla battle, but the then defense minister turned this down.
In the interview, he recalled — as if the event happened yesterday — turning down the proposal. He told the mutineers, “If we do that, we will all die. We cannot sustain it.”
Enrile said he knew from experience that guerrilla warfare would not be sustainable in terms of firepower, food, men and ammunition.
So, Enrile said, “Let’s confront the situation here in Metro Manila, and we must be ready to die.”
During the discussion on where they could hole up, some suggested Fort Bonifacio, “but I said no, that’s too big an area to control. We would be exposed to fire on all sides. Others suggested Villamor Air Base, but we could be hit by artillery from nearby camps.”
So Enrile suggested his office at Camp Aguinaldo, where they would take on the entire Marcos military. “That’s why we now have what is known as EDSA — because of that decision. It wasn’t really planned that way; it just happened to be the best choice at that moment,” he explained.
One of the revelations Enrile made was that the plans conceived then involving RAM were not aimed at President Marcos personally.
Contrary to public perception, our move wasn’t initially directed at him. It just happened that he had to be included because he was both Commander-in-Chief and President, but the military generals wanted to take advantage of the situation.
“The real opposition then was a junta secretly organized by the chief of staff, the heads of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Constabulary. I learned about this as early as November or December 1982, when Marcos returned from an official visit to Washington, D.C.,” Enrile revealed.
The junta’s plan: If something happened to President Marcos — say, he died — they would not immediately announce it. Instead, they would call a Cabinet meeting at Malacañang in his name, and then detain the Cabinet members.
Enrile said the RAM coup attempt occurred, in which he was involved, describing it as purely a military action. “We never intended to harm the First Family — only to immobilize them and ask the President to step down to restore democratic order. In a way, we were lucky the plan failed prematurely.”
Around 3 p.m. that Saturday, before the defection, he was interviewed by Radio Veritas and asked whether it was true that he was at Camp Aguinaldo preparing to announce the withdrawal of support for President Marcos. “I said yes. That was the first broadcast of the event.”
It was Ambassador Ernie Maceda who suggested I call General Ramos to ask if he would join.
When he called, Ramos said, “Let me go to another room” since he was entertaining guests — members of Marcos’ inner circle — who were also trying to convince him to withdraw support.
After a brief pause, Ramos said, “Yes, sir. I will join you.”
When asked if Enrile regretted what he did, he said, “No, I will not answer that question.”