Charter watchdog Philippine Constitution Association strongly urged the Supreme Court on Thursday to revisit its ruling blocking Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial, warning that its “flawed” interpretation of the law and bypassing Congress’ sole power over the case constituted “judicial activism.”
Former SC chief justice Reynato Puno, chair of the nearly seven-decade-old organization, contended that the SC verdict “overreached constitutional boundaries, disrupted the separation of powers, and weakened Congress’ exclusive authority” over impeachment cases, thereby necessitating an urgent review to avoid “dangerous abuse” in the future.
“This ruling, though perhaps well-intentioned, is a clear instance of judicial activism. It turns the judiciary from a neutral guardian of the Constitution into an arbiter of congressional timing and internal processes—matters the Constitution never assigned to the courts,” Puno said. “Judicial activism, if unchecked, becomes judicial supremacy. And that supremacy can, over time, paralyze the political departments that the people themselves empowered.”
The SC’s unanimous decision handed down last week effectively put a stop to Duterte’s trial in the Senate, supposedly set for 4 August.
The high court cited a violation of Duterte’s right to due process and Article XI, Section 3, Paragraph 5, which prohibits the filing of more than one impeachment case against the same official within a one-year period, as grounds to declare the case unconstitutional, null, and void ab initio (from the beginning).
To recall, Duterte was slapped with three impeachment complaints in barely two weeks in December last year. She was only officially impeached, however, on 5 February after the fourth complaint was signed and endorsed by 215 members of the House, surpassing the one-third threshold to bypass committee hearings and be transmitted directly to the Senate for trial.
Judicial misinterpretation
From a similar standpoint as some legal luminaries, Puno argued that the SC’s interpretation of the one-year bar was “constitutionally flawed” as the first three complaints, though officially endorsed and received by the secretary-general, never referred to the Speaker’s office and justice committee, which could have triggered the initiation.
The SC ruled that when the 19th Congress ended without the House acting on the first three complaints, the same were “effectively terminated and dismissed,” to which the one-year bar was reckoned.
Puno, however, countered that it was no less than the SC itself that had previously ruled, in Francisco v. House of Representatives, that an impeachment complaint was only deemed initiated after a verified complaint was found sufficient in form and substance and referred to the Committee on Justice.
“The [three] complaints never reached that stage. To treat them as having ‘initiated’ proceedings defies both logic and constitutional intent,” he asserted. “It interpreted the one-year bar so broadly that it now disables the very mechanism of impeachment in all but the rarest cases.”
Furthermore, Puno warned that this decision sets a dangerous precedent for impeachable officials or their allies “to deliberately file weak or premature complaints to consume the one-year window and block any real effort at accountability.”
“The one-year bar rule was designed to prevent harassment through repeated impeachment proceedings—not to protect impeachable officers from ever facing trial by allowing them to take cover behind mere filings,” PhilConsa said.
“To declare all those acts null and void—after the process had matured to the point of trial—is not only legally harsh, it is institutionally destabilizing. The doctrine exists precisely to prevent this outcome,” it added.
Impeachment Congress’ exclusive discretion
Puno also reminded the SC that only Congress has the sole power over impeachment, with the initiation resting with the House, while trial and judgment fall within the Senate. Hence, the judiciary’s role in these matters “should be limited to clear, grave abuses that nullify constitutional norms.”
Moreover, PhilConsa did not buy the SC’s conclusion that Duterte was deprived of due process when the articles of impeachment immediately advanced to the Senate, thereby robbing her of the opportunity to be heard and present rebuttal evidence in the committee.
The VP’s right to due process was respected, according to PhilconSa, as she was informed of the case, served with summons, and allowed to submit counter-affidavits.
“Let no court, no officer, and no institution stand in the way of constitutional duty…We remind all constitutional actors, legislators, jurists, and public officials alike, that accountability must not be undermined by technicality or judicial overreach,” the PhilConsa concluded.
Duterte was the first second-highest official impeached by the House on grounds of graft and corruption, bribery, betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, and other high crimes. The fourth complaint outlines seven articles of impeachment.
The House had already confirmed plans to file a motion for reconsideration to contest the SC decision. Some senators also expressed reservations about the ruling, citing the separation of powers and insisting that the trial shall proceed.